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FOREWORD
It is my pleasure to present to you the eighth edition of the World Bank’s Kenya Economic Update. Since the start of 2013, Kenyans have witnessed historic times. The successful elections in March and 
the peaceful transition of power in April, ushered in a new era of political leadership, which will guide 
the implementation of Kenya’s ambitious program of devolution. 
The report has three main messages. First, the economy is expected to achieve higher growth targets 
in 2013 (5.7 percent) and 2014 (6 percent) over what it achieved in 2012 (4.6 percent), as a result 
of the smooth election process. However, the government will need to make a concerted effort, if it 
wishes to approach the 10 percent annual growth rate foreseen in Vision 2030. The report’s second 
message emphasizes on the steps that the government needs to take to create an enabling framework 
for significant private sector-led growth. The Government needs to continue to invest in infrastructure, 
to increase domestic energy production, to address the other bottlenecks that affect the cost of doing 
business, and to continue following sound monetary and fiscal policies. Finally, the report’s third message 
focuses on the poverty situation in Kenya, noting progress made since 2005, when an estimated 47 
percent of the population lived below the poverty line, to the present, where poverty estimates range 
between 34 and 42 percent, the imprecision resulting from the lack of any recent survey data. The 
report notes the spatial dimension of poverty, and the poor tend to live in the arid and semi-arid regions 
in the north and north east. It concludes with thoughts about a poverty reduction strategy, which would 
emphasize on job creation, enhanced productivity of smallholder farms, strengthening and expanding 
cash transfer programs, targeted public spending programs to provide quality education to the rural 
poor, and improved poverty monitoring, so that the government can rapidly see which activities have 
the greatest impacts on improving the lives of the poor.  
The World Bank remains committed to helping Kenya as it launches a new political administration that 
will have the challenging task of implementing a devolved form of government. The World Bank’s series 
of Economic Updates, which we publish in a new edition every six months, have become our leading 
vehicle to analyze development trends in Kenya, and to contribute to the implementation of the Bank’s 
strategy for sub-Saharan Africa, which puts a special emphasis on knowledge and partnerships. With 
these reports, we aim to support all those who want to improve economic management in Kenya. As in 
the past, we are proud to have worked with many Kenyan economic stakeholders during the preparation 
of this report. We hope that you too will join us in debating policy issues that are topical in Kenya today, 
and in making your contribution to helping Kenya to grow, to achieve a permanent reduction in poverty, 
and to bring shared prosperity to all Kenyans. 
Diarietou Gaye
Country Director for Kenya
World Bank
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MAIN MESSAGES AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Main Messages
• Kenya’s economy is still operating below its potential. However, given the domestic and global environment, 
growth was satisfactory in 2012. After a peaceful election and transition in 2013, growth is projected to rise to 5.7 
percent in 2013 and 6.0 percent in 2014, supported by lower interest rates and higher investment growth.
• The economy is still vulnerable to external shocks, which can erode the significant gains it has achieved. This 
external vulnerability can be reduced by increasing both domestic and foreign savings. Structural reforms that 
improve the business environment would incentivize more FDI to flow to Kenya, and increase the rate of growth 
and savings. These reforms must involve tax and expenditure measures that increase both savings and investment 
so as to allow Kenya to take advantage of low labor costs, and its coastal location to expand manufacturing 
exports.
• Poverty has likely declined. Kenya’s poverty level is estimated to have declined from 47 percent in 2005, to 
between 34 to 42 percent today (imprecise estimates due to the fact that the last household survey was conducted 
in 2005-06). Kenya needs to undertake a new survey to update poverty estimates, and inform government’s 
poverty reduction strategies.
• Kenya remains a country of contrasts, especially in service delivery. On average, Kenyans are healthier, more 
educated, and receive better infrastructure services than they did a decade ago. At the same time, a large fraction 
of the population continues to live with sub-standard access to water, sanitation and energy. 
Key Recommendations to sustain the growth momentum
• For the medium term, Kenya needs to boost productivity and regain its competitiveness. To maintain high growth 
rates, Kenya needs to continue investing in infrastructure and human capital, improve the business and regulatory 
environment, and diversify exports. The challenge for Kenya is to engineer policies to boost productivity growth 
and foster job creation, i.e. reinvigorate both engines of the economy. The best way to achieve this is to maintain 
macroeconomic stability, to develop a business environment that promotes investment and job creation, and to 
increase the stock of physical and human capital.
• Foreign Direct Investment is key to Kenya’s development agenda. Since domestic savings are low, attracting 
FDI would supplement domestic savings in financing Kenya’s growth agenda. Kenya should aggressively seek 
more productivity enhancing FDI to diversify its economy, and develop its private sector, encouraging technology 
transfer to sharpen its competitive edge in the external market. 
• The ultimate objective of Kenya’s development strategy is to make it more inclusive. The new administration 
promises to make growth more inclusive. This can only be done through reforms to promote economic 
diversification and job creation, and tackling infrastructure gaps.
Key Recommendations to make poverty history
• A system of poverty monitoring is needed—with nationally representative household budget surveys as a 
foundation—to understand how, where and why poverty is changing, and to inform public policy. Without more 
frequent surveys, there has been a missed opportunity to understand whether economic gains and government 
policy have generated pathways out of poverty for the poor. 
• Sustained poverty reduction requires the creation of more productive jobs. To encourage the growth of the 
low and middle skills jobs that will represent pathways out of poverty for the poor, the government can work 
to improve the competitiveness of manufactured exports, and the investment and business environment. In 
addition, as the majority of Kenya’s poor depend on agriculture for their livelihood, helping them gain access to 
inputs and markets can drive poverty reduction in the short term.
• Poverty reduction can be accelerated with greater equity in Kenyan society through more effective public 
spending and stronger cash transfer programs. Public spending should work to remove the role that geography, 
gender, ethnicity and wealth play in influencing access to key services, so that everyone is in a good position 
to seize the opportunities being generated in a growing economy. Strengthening, harmonizing and expanding 
Kenya’s array of cash transfer programs with will help reduce poverty, by enabling poor households to consume 
more, invest in productive assets, and achieve their education and health goals.
June 2013 | Edition No. 8 v
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Kenya Rising? 
The new Kenyan government has taken office at a time when there is a new optimism for Kenya 
rising. While Kenya’s economic performance over 
the past decade has lagged behind the average 
for sub-Saharan Africa, even when resource rich 
countries are excluded, there is palpable sense 
that Kenya has turned a corner with peaceful 
elections in March 2013, and the smooth transition 
of power in April. If these developments reflect 
the maturing of Kenya’s political system, there 
is equal optimism that Kenya has put behind the 
troubling economic periods that have regularly 
followed its previous election cycles. Kenya’s 
economic performance for 2012, proved stronger 
than anticipated at 4.6 percent, historically high 
compared with recent election year periods, and 
the forecasts for 2013 (5.7 percent) and 2014 
(6.0 percent) are encouraging. Yet Kenya could do 
much better, and there is no doubt that the new 
government wants to unleash the potential of the 
Kenyan economy. 
What will it take for the Kenyan economy to 
break its pattern of underperformance? Over the 
past decade, Kenya’s economy grew at an average 
of 3.8 percent. This is better than in previous 
decades, but below its potential, its ambition, and 
its peers. While an increasing number of African 
countries have already reached Middle Income 
status, Kenya has lagged behind. Today, out of 48 
sub-Saharan African countries, 22 countries have 
reached a per-capita income of US$ 1025—the 
official threshold of middle income. At about US$ 
820 Kenya’s GDP per capita, it ranks 24th and only 
represents about half the sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
average. Excluding South Africa, sub-Saharan 
Africa grew at an average of 6 percent since 
2002. East Africa as a whole grew even more, at 
6.5 percent, and without Kenya it would have 
grown at almost 7 percent (see Figure 1). Kenya 
has been following, not leading Africa’s growth 
momentum. Part of the problem has been a series 
of exogenous shocks that have periodically set 
back the economy. There have been droughts, oil 
price spikes and the blow back from the recession 
in the European Union, a major trading partner. 
Kenya’s neighboring countries have experienced 
most of the same shocks, yet managed more 
robust growth. Why has Kenya lagged? This 
report delves into this problem and identifies 
the structural issues that separate Kenya from its 
peers. Fortunately, many of the challenges, such 
as the business environment constraints affecting 
the private sector, can be addressed in the short-
and medium-term. 
For Kenya to grow higher, it needs more stability 
and a new approach to economic development. 
For Kenya to grow beyond 5 percent, it needs to 
enhance the contribution of exports as an engine of 
growth which is now dominated by consumption. 
Today, net exports are a drag on growth, having 
reduced overall growth by 4.1 percent in 2012 
(see Figure 1.6)—and as reflected in a large and 
widening current account deficit. This is holding 
back the growth momentum. If Kenya was to 
balance its external position, i.e. matching imports 
with exports, while maintaining current levels of 
consumption and investments, it’s overall growth 
would already be at 8 percent.
Figure 1: Kenya is lagging its peers
Source: World Bank estimates
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Kenya entered 2013 on a strong economic footing, 
and peaceful elections are giving it an additional 
boost. Agriculture and manufacturing are 
benefitting from stable rains, which both stimulate 
production and drive down the costs of Kenya’s 
hydro-generated electricity. Monetary and fiscal 
policies also contributed to the recovery. Declining 
inflation allowed the Central Bank of Kenya to 
lower its benchmark interest rate to 8.5 percent, 
and the shift from recurrent towards development 
expenditure, especially for infrastructure, is also 
supporting the growth momentum.
However, the current growth model cannot spur 
growth rates of 10 percent, as 
envisaged under Vision 2030. 
The structure of the Kenyan 
economy would need to change 
in order to attain sustainable 
growth rates of around 10 
percent. First, the overall level of 
savings and investment, needs 
to increase in order to raise the 
economy’s potential growth. To 
raise the investment rate, the 
economy would also need to 
attract more foreign savings in form of foreign 
direct investment. Second, exports, which have 
been subdued for almost a decade, would have to 
contribute more to growth. 
Several challenges would need to be addressed 
for the economy to make this desired shift. 
The quantity and quality of public infrastructure 
need further improvement, in order to lower 
transport costs and facilitate trade in goods and 
services (tourism). Facilitating trade also requires 
streamlining procedures for exporting and 
importing, as well as efforts to avoid overvaluation 
of the real exchange rate. The exchange rate should 
support exports and make domestic goods more 
competitive vis-à-vis imports. A weak business 
environment is another constraint to investment 
and economic activity: a more conducive business 
environment would generate new economic 
activity, which would translate into more jobs, 
including the formal sector. In addition to raising 
the stock of physical capital, improvements in 
human capital (in particular through education 
and health) are needed to raise potential output. 
The state of poverty
Today, Kenya’s poverty rate is estimated to be in the range of between 34 and 42 percent. 
Given the absence of a household survey since 
2005—the year Kenya last conducted one, more 
recent poverty estimates are based on projections, 
and depend on various assumptions, including 
on the evolution of inequality in Kenya. If recent 
economic growth benefited all Kenyans in a 
similar way (i.e. if inequality remained stable), the 
poverty rate would be close to 38 
percent. But poverty would be lower 
(or higher) if inequality increased 
(or decreased) say by one percent 
per year, poverty would have fallen 
to only 42 percent (34 percent). A 
more complex projection using the 
more recent census and other data 
sources of social wellbeing come 
to a similar conclusion: Over the 
last decade, Kenya’s poverty has 
probably declined slowly (at about 1 percentage 
point per year), but remains at very high absolute 
levels about 42 percent in 2009.
As in other countries, poverty in Kenya is much 
deeper and much more pronounced in rural 
and remote regions. Poverty rates are highest 
in the arid and semi-arid regions in the north 
and north east. Geographically, areas with very 
little annual rainfall, and thus, low agricultural 
potential have acute poverty. These regions have 
also been historically neglected, reflecting Kenya’s 
unbalanced geographical development. In 2005, 
poverty rates in arid regions (78 percent) were 
nearly double the poverty rates in medium and 
high potential agricultural areas (with a poverty 
rate of 41 percent).
However, Kenya’s poorest places are not the 
same places where most of the poor live (see 
Figure 2). Kenya’s lagging areas are sparsely 
populated and more isolated from it’s urban 
Kenya’s poverty rate 
is estimated to be in 
the range of between 
34 and 42 percent. 
Given the absence of a 
household survey 
since 2005
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economic engines—Nairobi, Mombasa and 
Kisumu. The majority of Kenya’s poor live in the 
denser and higher potential agricultural zones, in 
the vicinity of large urban centers. In this context, 
better integration of high potential rural areas 
to large urban markets and providing access 
to quality basic services everywhere is critical. 
Kenya’s development—as elsewhere—has been 
unbalanced geographically, and characterized by 
the growth of economic and population density 
in towns and cities. Urbanization is driven by an 
increasingly mobile and educated population, that 
is meeting economic opportunities where they 
are created. Facilitating migration 
and managing the urbanization 
process are two strategies that will 
support poverty reduction in Kenya. 
At the same time, promoting a more 
productive and healthy agricultural 
sector supports this process, helping 
towns and cities to prosper, as well as 
the villages that many people leave behind.
As expected, poverty is strongly associated with 
low levels of education and large households. 
Primary and secondary school completion rates 
are the lowest amongst the poorest individuals. 
In 2009, the average size of households among 
the poorest 20 percent of households was 5.2 
compared to a national average of 4.3 and an 
average of 3.5 among the wealthiest households.  
Between 1989 and 2009, Kenya has also 
experienced positive developments in several 
non-income dimensions of poverty, but not all 
of them. On average, Kenyans are increasingly 
healthy and more educated, enjoying better living 
conditions, and an expanded set of consumption 
opportunities. At the same time, a large fraction of 
the population continues to live with sub-standard 
access to water, sanitation and energy (see Table 
1). Inequality of opportunity is quite high. Indeed, 
for many, the sheer luck of where in the country 
a person is born, one‘s ethnicity and one’s family 
wealth play an outsize role in determining access 
to basic opportunities. 
When it comes to delivery of critical opportunities 
and services, Kenya’s performance is mixed: 
Extraordinary success stands side by side with 
resounding failures (see Table 1):
- In the past 8 years, Kenya has experienced 
a true telecommunications revolution with 
household phone ownership increasing at an 
average rate of 30 percent per year since 2005.
- Kenya has also made significant gains in making 
basic education accessible broadly—primary 
enrollment rates are now almost universal. 
The next challenge for Kenya is to 
strengthen classroom learning, 
by reducing teacher absenteeism 
(a recent study found that almost 
one in two teachers (45 percent) 
are not in the classroom during 
scheduled teaching times) and 
improving teacher knowledge 
and performance through training. 
- This past decade has been a major success for 
child health: under-five mortality fell by over 4 
percent per year, driven in part by the scaling 
of evidence-based child health interventions. 
Maternal health and child nutrition however, 
remains a challenge. 
- While household access to electricity increased 
in Kenya between 1989 and 2009 by about 4 
percent per year, over three in four households 
Kenyans are increasingly 
healthy and more 
educated, enjoying 
better living conditions
Figure 2: Has growth and inequality driven poverty down?
Source: World Bank
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still do not have access to electricity, and the 
improvements were more concentrated in the 
counties around Nairobi.
- Access to clean water and decent sanitation 
facilities remains elusive to a majority of 
Kenyans. There is evidence that access to 
clean water is not keeping up with rates of 
urbanization in the towns and cities outside of 
Nairobi, where access to piped water or public 
tap water declined by over 2 percent per year 
between 1989 and 2009.
Making poverty history
Kenya needs higher growth to reduce poverty faster. With the historic GDP growth rates of 
4-5 percent, average per-capita incomes are only 
rising by about two percent a year, given that 
Kenya’s population growth rate is still at a high 
2.6 percent. If the wealthier are benefitting more, 
which is probable even though not proven, the 
poverty reduction benefits of Kenya’s moderate 
growth momentum have arguably been very 
limited. 
In shifting gears, Kenya also needs to complement 
rapid growth with equity. At times Kenya achieved 
higher growth but these periods were short-
lived because—like a car driving at 80 kilometers 
per hour in the third gear—Kenya has not been 
able to shift gears to grow at a higher speed for 
a sustained period. But in addition to addressing 
barriers to higher sustained growth, Kenya needs 
to address its still quite high levels of poverty. This 
in turn, will most probably require reducing its 
high levels of inequality. Indeed, Kenya can only 
eliminate extreme poverty by 2030, the World 
Bank’s global poverty target, if it reduces poverty 
by 2 percentage points each year. Such a high rate 
of poverty reduction is only possible if growth 
is accompanied by a reduction in inequality. 
This means that the poor need to benefit to a 
disproportionate extent from economic growth, 
both through new economic opportunities and by 
ensuring that safety nets are adequately buffering 
the vulnerable form shocks.
Table 1: Kenya: A country of contrasts in service delivery
Social and 
infrastructure 
indicators
Assessment Trend Indicators
Connectivity 100 percent connectivity 
almost achieved; calling rates 
among the lowest in the 
world
Kenya experienced a true 
telecoms revolution
Percentage of households 
with at least one mobile 
phone increased 30 percent 
per year since 2005
Education Primary enrollment almost 
universal but quality remains 
a major challenge
Some improvement but low 
“value for money”
Health Sharp reduction in child 
mortality; high levels of 
maternal mortality
Some improvements Under-five mortality fell by 
over 4 percent per year since 
2000
Electricity While household access to 
electricity increased in Kenya 
between 1999 and 1989 the 
improvements were more 
concentrated in the counties 
around Nairobi.
Some improvement Households with access to 
electricity increased by over
4 percent per year since 1990
Water (urban) Connectivity did not keep the 
same pace as urban popula-
tion growth
Deteriorating Percent of households with 
access to piped water or 
public tap water declined by 
over 2 percent per year since 
1990 in urban areas outside 
Nairobi
Source: World Bank computations 
- Note: Colors indicate strong progress (green), some progress (orange), no progress (red).
The State of Kenya’s EconomyThe analyses presented in this report point to 
five elements of a poverty reduction strategy. 
These are:
(i) Fostering pro-poor economic growth and 
job creation. To encourage the growth of 
low and middle skills jobs, especially in 
manufacturing, the government needs 
to improve export competitiveness and 
improve the investment and business 
environment more broadly.
(ii) Enhancing the productivity of smallholder 
farms. Since the majority of Kenya’s poor 
depend on smallholder agriculture for their 
livelihood, increasing their productivity 
through the use of fertilizer, improved seeds 
and access to markets, will lead to significant 
poverty reduction in the short to medium 
term. 
(iii) Strengthening and expanding the cash 
transfer programs that protect and provide 
income support to the poor. Stronger cash 
transfer programs and more equitable and 
effective public spending for leveling the 
playing field in access to key opportunities—
such as quality education, energy, water and 
sanitation—will be key to increasing equity 
in the Kenyan society.
(iv) Using public spending to make key 
opportunities available to Kenyans of all 
backgrounds. Particularly important in 
this regard is ensuring that children from 
households in all income groups have 
access to quality education, which will have 
positive effects on poverty reduction, both 
through a growth effect (skilled workers 
earn more) and an inequality effect (having 
a higher supply of skills would drive down 
the skills premium and reduce inequality).
(v) Investing in a system of routine household 
budget surveys to monitor poverty and 
inequality. To convincingly monitor the 
impact of Government policies on household 
consumption, equity and poverty reduction, 
comprehensive and comparable household 
surveys need to be implemented regularly.
Executive Summary
June 2013 | Edition No. 8x
Executive Summary
June 2013 | Edition No. 8 xi
The State of Kenya’s Economy
1.1 A resilient economy in times of adversity
Kenya grew at 4.6 percent in 2012 amid a weak global economy. In early 2012, the 
economy was weak, mainly due to high interest 
rates resulting from high inflation which peaked 
at the end of 2011. Over the course of 2012, 
the Government succeeded in stabilizing the 
economy. Inflation declined to below 5 percent 
at the end of 2012—overall average for 2012 
was 9.6 percent—which helped to stabilize the 
exchange rate, and allowed for a gradual easing 
of monetary policy. However, that success came 
at a cost. The tight monetary policy stance which 
started in the second half of 2011 triggered a 
noticeable slowdown in economic activity in 2012, 
as domestic demand remained low on account of 
the high cost of capital.
Economic growth picked up in the second half 
of 2012. After growing at only 4.2 percent in the 
first half of 2012, the economy accelerated to 4.9 
percent in the second half. Fourth quarter growth 
was 5.3 percent, which represented the highest 
economic performance since the end of 2010 
when the economy grew at 8.3 percent. The strong 
performance in the second half of the year was 
driven by domestic demand, as exports continued 
to suffer from the weak global environment.
Kenya’s economic performance continued to 
lag behind the rest of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
particularly, when compared to other East 
African Community (EAC) countries. For the last 
ten years, other than in 2005, Kenya recorded 
lower annual GDP growth than the average for 
sub-Saharan Africa, and compared to its neighbors 
in the East African Community. Kenya’s annual 
growth rate for the decade averaged 4.6 percent, 
compared to 6 percent for SSA, 6.9 percent for 
Tanzania, 7.1 percent for Uganda, and 7.2 percent 
for Rwanda. Since the beginning of the global crisis 
in 2008, the economy has struggled to recover 
from a number of shocks, including the aftermath 
of the violence that followed the elections in 
2007, reduced demand in the Euro zone, Kenya’s 
largest trading partner, and the impact resulting 
from high international oil prices. These shocks 
resulted in low export growth and higher imports. 
Unfavorable climatic conditions hurt agriculture 
output, and hydro power generation in 2009 
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1.1: Growth picked up during the second half of 2012
Source: World Bank Staff calculations based on KNBS data
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The Kenyan economy has stabilized and could again be in a position for a takeoff. Inflation has declined to below the 5 percent target, and expectations are anchored at a lower level for the 
rest of 2013, the international reserves have climbed to over US$ 5b (over four months of import 
cover), public debt to GDP level has declined to below 45 percent, and credit has started to flow 
back to finance economic activities. The optimism of  Kenya’s economy is reflected by high volumes 
of trading in the fixed income securities and equities market. GDP growth in 2012 was 4.6 percent, 
and is projected to grow to 5.7 and 6 percent in 2013 and 2014, respectively. Despite the optimism, 
risks do remain. The economy is still vulnerable to exogenous shocks as the large current account 
deficit threatens macroeconomic stability, the real appreciation of the shilling is eroding Kenya’s 
competitiveness and stifling the export sector, which is supposed to be at the center point for poverty 
reduction. 
1. Economic Performance
and 2010. Security threats impacted growth in 
the service sector, through reduced numbers of 
tourists.
Economic growth in 2012 was broad based. Unlike 
in 2011 when growth was driven predominantly 
by service sectors, industry and agriculture also 
had a good year in 2012. Agriculture output grew 
by 3.8 percent, more than twice its growth in 
2011. Agriculture’s strong growth resulted from 
good rainfall in the first quarter, which boosted 
the production of maize, beans and sugarcane 
among other crops. Tea production declined 
by 2.2 percent in 2012, due to adverse weather 
conditions characterized by frost attack in some 
tea growing areas. A bumper harvest of staple 
food—maize and beans—eased their prices 
and contributed to reduced food inflation in the 
second half of 2012. Maize production increased 
by 16.3 percent, as Kenya produced 40 million 
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Figure 1.2: Kenya is lagging behind SSA
Source: World Bank Staff calculations based on Global Economic Prospects, 2013
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  Box 1.1: Why is Kenya underperforming?
Kenya’s economic growth rate has not matched even once Africa’s growth rate in the course of the past decade, though 
the two were close in most years. Kenya’s relatively weak economic performance can be attributed to three main factors: 
internal shocks, lack of natural resources, and economic fundamentals. Internal shocks explain the widening gap between 
Kenya’s and Africa’s growth rate in 2008-09 and 2011, while the other two explain Kenya’s overall underperformance.
Kenya’s economy was hit by several disruptive events over the last five years. The post-election violence of 2008 caused 
economic activity to plummet in fear of violence and political uncertainty. As the political situation calmed, the agriculture 
sector faced a severe drought in 2009 which continued to dampen economic output. The outlook improved in 2010, but 
2011 brought signs of macroeconomic instability, fueled by expansionary monetary policy; and economic growth again 
slowed. 
One key reason behind Africa’s strong performance over the past decade has been the commodity boom. Various natural 
resources were discovered across the continent, which, in a global environment of raising demand and prices, generated a 
substantial share of the economic growth. Kenya has not been as fortunate –though this may change in the medium-term-, 
hence this explains part of the gap vis-à-vis the continent’s performance.
The remainder of the gap in growth, in particular compared to other East African countries, can be explained by 
differences in economic fundamentals. First, Kenyans save less than their neighbors, hence they invest less, and investment 
is a key ingredient for rapid and sustainable growth. Second, infrastructure bottlenecks continue to be a drag on economic 
activity. The dire situation in railways, the inefficiencies at the Mombasa port and the congestion on Kenya’s roads attest 
to this. Finally, the business environment has not seen the improvement it needs to unleash Kenya’s growth potential. 
Other neighbors, e.g. Rwanda, have made great progress in streamlining business regulations. In Kenya, on the other hand, 
paying taxes, getting electricity, registering a property, and starting a business, continue to be excessively time-consuming 
and costly. 
Source: World Bank
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bags in 2012 compared to 34.4 million bags in 
2011. Wheat production increased by 54 percent 
in 2012 to 163 thousand tonnes.
Industrial output rose by 4.5 percent in 2012 
compared to 2.9 percent in the same period for 
2011. The main driver of industry growth was 
electricity and the water sector which grew by 
10.3 percent in 2012, after a negative growth in 
2011. Installed electricity capacity expanded by 
4.7 percent from 1534 MW in 2011 to 1606 MW 
in 2012. Hydropower generation grew by 21.6 
percent in 2012 accounted for 50.7 percent of 
total power generations. Manufacturing sector 
recorded a 3.1 percent growth in 2012, compared 
to 3.4 percent in the same period in 2011. The 
slowdown in manufacturing was as a result of 
stiff competition from imported goods, high costs 
of credit and political uncertainties, due to pre-
election jitters. Building and Construction is the 
only subsector which recorded a higher growth 
rate in 2012 when compared to 2011. It grew by 4.8 
percent in 2012, compared to 4.3 percent in 2011. 
The growth in this subsector was driven by loans 
and advances which increased by 36.2 percent 
in 2012, and increased government expenditure 
in the Ministry of Roads which increased by 29 
percent in 2012.
Although most service sectors grew in 2012, 
growth was in many instances lower compared 
to 2011. From 5.2 percent growth in 2011, services 
grew by 4.6 percent in 2012. The deceleration of 
growth came as a result of tight monetary policy. All 
other subsectors recorded a slowdown in growth 
as: wholesale trade grew at 6.4 in 2012, compared 
with 7.3 percent in 2011; financial intermediation 
growth stood at 6.5 percent in 2012 against 7.8 
Figure 1.5: Growth in services declined in all sectors including tourism except public administration
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on KNBS data
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Figure 1.3: Growth in 2012 was broad based
Source: World Bank Staff calculations based on KNBS data
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Figure 1.4: Hydro generation rebounded in 2012
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on KNBS data
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percent in 2011; real estate growth slowed to 3.3 
percent from 3.6 percent in 2011; and, hotels and 
tourism activity grew by 2.6 percent (compared to 
5.0 percent in 2011). Tourist arrivals at both Jomo 
Kenyatta and Moi International Airports declined 
by 6.1 percent in 2012—from 1.8 million visitors in 
2011 to 1.7 million in 2012—due to security threats 
in the region and the Euro-zone economic crisis. 
On the other hand, transport and communication 
growth accelerated from 4.1 percent in 2011 to 
5.3 percent in 2012.
Private consumption continues to underpin 
aggregate demand and growth. Real domestic 
demand grew sharply in 2012, supported by a 
recovery in private and government consumption. 
Gross domestic expenditure grew by 6.8 percent 
in 2012, up from 5.8 percent in 2011. This was 
mainly driven by private consumption (which 
constitute 65 percent of aggregate demand and 79 
percent of Real GDP) growth which increased to 
5.5 percent in 2012 from 3.0 percent in 2011. The 
mild growth in private consumption was explained 
by a high interest regime in 2012. Government 
final consumption expenditure (which constitutes 
12 percent of aggregate demand and 15 percent 
of Real GDP) grew sharply by 9.3 percent in 
2012, the highest in 5 years, to cater for the 
new constitutional offices and election related 
expenditure.
Investment growth was strong in 2012, but 
lower than in 2011. Gross investment moderated 
slightly in 2012, as high interest rates and political 
uncertainty slowed down demand for investment 
goods. Gross fixed capital formation grew by 11.5 
percent in 2012, down from 12.6 percent in 2011. 
The drop is explained by other machinery and 
equipment (which constitutes 38 percent of gross 
fixed capital formation) which grew by 11.4 percent 
in 2012, significantly down from 27.1 percent in 
2011, as a result of political uncertainties related 
to 2013 election jitters.  Building structures (which 
constitute 43 percent) grew modestly in 2012 at 4.4 
percent, up from 3.5 percent in 2011, due to the 
prevailing high interest rate. Transport equipment 
(constituting 18 percent) grew sharply in 2012, 
growing at 27 percent as demand for vehicles to 
carry out elections campaigns intensified.
Net exports continued to be a drag on Kenya’s 
GDP growth, with a negative contribution of 4.1 
percentage points. Even though both exports 
and imports growth moderated in 2012, the gap 
between exports and imports widened. In local 
currency terms, exports growth slowed down to 
4.7 percent in 2012, compared to 6.6 percent in 
2011, while growth of imports declined from 15.6 
percent to 12.5 percent in the same period. The 
strength in imports growth reflect the importation 
of transport equipment and machinery for oil and 
gas exploration, while the weakness in export 
growth is mainly due to a strong shilling and weak 
global demand, especially in the euro zone.
High frequency indicators present a picture that 
is broadly consistent with subdued growth. 
High frequency data reflected the weakness of 
the demand side, and underperformance on 
the supply side. On the production side, cement 
production plummeted from a growth of 20.7 
percent in 2011, to 3.6 percent in 2012, while 
sales dropped from a growth of 24.7 percent to 1.7 
percent in the same period. The fall was attributed 
to low access to credit and higher interest rates. 
Total motor vehicle registrations declined by 15.9 
Figure 1.6: Consumption continues to be the key driver of 
Kenya’s growth offsetting net export weakness
Source: World Bank staff calculation Based on KNBS data
Note: Statistical discrepancy explains the difference the sum of 
(consumption, investment and net exports) and actual GDP growth
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in 2012, after a 5 percent growth in 2011, and 
motorcycle sales declined by 33 percent in 2012, 
compared to a 20 percent growth in 2011.  
Inflationary pressure moderated in 2012. 
Month on month overall inflation declined for 12 
consecutive months in 2012 from 18.9 percent 
in December 2011 to 3.2 percent in December 
2012. Average annual inflation declined from 14 
percent in 2011, to 9.6 percent in 2012. This was 
as a result of monetary policy tightening, and the 
absence of any new fuel and food price shocks. On 
the contrary, international oil prices fell in 2012, 
and abundant rainfall reduced electricity prices. 
Bumper harvests in quarter three eased food 
inflation. Core inflation (which excludes food and 
oil price movements) declined from 11.6 percent 
in December 2011, to 5.5 percent in December 
2012. Overall, Inflation has edged a notch higher 
in the first quarter of 2013, but remains below the 
medium target level of 5 percent.
1.2 Kenya’s fiscal prudency is paying off 
The government’s fiscal framework continues to support macroeconomic stability. The 
government has successfully maintained fiscal 
discipline in the face of election year pressures, 
and the high costs of security operations in 
Somalia. Moreover, the economic slowdown—and 
the resulting lower than anticipated revenue—did 
not shake the Government’s commitment to fiscal 
discipline. Despite a decline in total revenue of 
0.8 percent of GDP in 2011/12, the primary deficit 
was kept at around 2 percent of GDP, and the same 
deficit is projected to be achieved in 2013.
The aggregate fiscal position remains sound, 
despite the overall fiscal deficit having increased 
in 2011/12 and 2012/13. The deterioration of the 
deficit (commitment basis3) from 4.5 percent of 
GDP in 2010/11, to 5.6 percent in 2011/12, and 
the budgeted 6.7 percent in 2012/13 has come as 
a result of increased spending on infrastructure, 
in particular geothermal power and roads.  The 
boost in development expenditure has been 
accompanied by a constraint on recurrent 
spending: capital spending increased by 1.3 
percent of GDP in 2011/12, while recurrent 
spending declined by 1.5 percent of GDP.
The State of Kenya’s Economy
June 2013 | Edition No. 86
Figure 1.7: inflationary pressures have come under control
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on KNBS data
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Figure 1.8: Fiscal position remains strong despite 
deterioration of the overall balance
Source: World Bank Staff calculations based on Ministry of Finance data
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3  The gap between the projected and actual deficits is a result of expected underperformance in spending.
Kenya is on track to return public debt levels to 
their healthy 2007 level of less than 40 percent. 
This level of public debt would give it ample room 
for policy maneuvering. Lowering public debt 
would also help mitigate the widening current 
account deficit.
Fiscal policy has strengthened Kenya’s debt 
sustainability, as the trend in rising public debt 
was reversed in 2012. Kenya’s total net public 
debt-to-GDP ratio declined in 2012, as a result of 
prudent fiscal policy and a stable macroeconomic 
environment. At the end of 2012, Kenya’s public 
debt stood at 42.9 percent of GDP, compared to 
47.2 percent in 2011. Public external debt declined 
from 26.2 percent to 22.5 percent of GDP in the 
same period, mainly on account of exchange rate 
movement, and in part on the retirement of the 
syndicated loans issued in 2011.
The structure of public debt is favorable. Most 
of Kenya’s public external debt remains on 
concessional terms, although its commercial 
component increased to about 10 percent at the 
end of 2012, mainly as a result of a syndicated 
loan of about US$ 600 million. External debt 
portfolio is mainly owed to multilateral creditors 
(59.9 percent), followed by bilateral (31.2 percent) 
and commercial (7.1 percent) creditors. Overall, 
the maturity structure of Kenya’s external debt is 
long term, with over 77 percent with a maturity 
of over 10 years, 20.7 percent with 5-10 years 
maturity, and less than 3 percent with less than 
4 year maturity.4 The external debt is mainly 
denominated in the Euro (33 percent), the US 
Dollar (31 percent) and the Japanese Yen (16 
percent).5 Government’s net domestic debt fell 
from 21 percent of GDP at the end of 2011, to 
20.4 percent of GDP at the end of 2012. Most of 
the domestic debt is held by commercial banks in 
form of T-bills and government bonds (comprising 
of 19 percent and 75 percent of domestic debt, 
respectively). The share of domestic debt held 
by non-banks increased from 40.8 percent to 
43 percent of the total between 2011 and 2012, 
reflecting a diversification of the domestic investor 
base.6 
The yield curves movements reflected political 
developments in the last 9 months. The yield 
curve shifted outwards in response to political 
uncertainty of the March 2013 general election. 
Between September 2012 and March 2013, the 
average interest rates on government securities 
increased by an average of 170 basis points (for 
securities of over 10 years), 307 basis points (over 
one year but up to 10 years), and 188 percent 
(less than one year). However by May 2013, the 
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Figure 1.9: Kenya’s public debt declined in 2012 
Source: IMF/World Bank: Kenya DSA 2013
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4 Data for June 2011, Source: Ministry of Finance: Annual Public Debt Management Report December 2011.
5 Among Others: Yuan - 6 percent and Sterling pounds - 5 percent.
6 By March 2013, holders of domestic debt were distributed as follows Commercial Banks 48.45 percent, non-banks 45.1 percent, CBK 5.6 percent and 
non-residents 0.9 percent. Non-banks include Pension Funds (majority in terms of share), insurance companies, and parastatals.
Figure 1.10: Yield curve movements in the last 9 months 
reflected political developments
Source: World Bank Staff calculations based on Bloomberg data
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risk related to elections has started to decline, and 
the yield curve has shifted downwards (see figure 
1.10). Between March and May 2013, yields have 
reduced by 24 basis points (securities of over 10 
years), 95 basis points (securities of over one year 
but up to 10 years), and 115 basis points (securities 
of one years and less).
The decline in public debt has increased the fiscal 
space which Kenya plans to use to borrow on 
international markets. A US$ 1 billion sovereign 
bond issue is planned for September 2013. The 
government will use the funds partly to repay 
the syndicated loans issued in 2011/12, and 
partly to finance infrastructure projects. Debt 
sustainability indicators are not expected to 
deteriorate significantly following the sovereign 
bond issuance. 
The government faced some challenges in 
implementing fiscal policy in 2012/13, as revenue 
underperformed, while pressures for increasing 
personnel expenditures through higher wages and 
new constitutional offices grew.  For the first half 
of 2012/13, the overall fiscal deficit deteriorated 
to 3.2 percent as a share of GDP, slightly lower 
than the targeted level of 3.3 percent of GDP, 
but higher than the 2 percent of GDP in the same 
period in 2011/2012. The deterioration came as a 
result of lower revenue and increased government 
spending in the first half of 2012/2013. The deficit 
was financed largely by domestic borrowing (of 
3 percent of GDP), while new foreign borrowing 
was 0.3 percent of GDP. The primary fiscal deficit 
reached 1.6 percent of GDP in the first half of the 
fiscal year, higher than the 0.75 percent of GDP 
deficit in the same period of 2011/12.
Government revenue as share of GDP has 
declined slightly over the last two years. 
Revenues declined from a peak of 23.9 percent of 
GDP in 2009/10, to 22.8 percent in 2011/12. In the 
first half of 2012/2013 tax revenues continued to 
decline further to 10.2 percent of GDP, against the 
target of 12.4 percent, and less than the 2010/11 
outturn of 10.5 percent of GDP, mainly on account 
of reduced VAT collection. 
Lower revenue collection is a consequence of 
weaker VAT and excise duty collection. VAT and 
excise revenues declined by 0.6 percent and 
0.5 percent of GDP, respectively in 2011/12.
Parliament’s delay in approving the new VAT Bill 
on which targets were based, partly explains the 
lower VAT collection. Government’s collection of 
income taxes, which accounts for about 40 percent 
of domestic tax revenue, increased slightly. 
Despite lower collection, fiscal revenue was 
sufficient to fully finance the budget’s recurrent 
expenditure, and part of its capital spending. The 
ratio of total revenue to recurrent expenditure has 
increased from 1.07 in 2007/08 to 1.16 in 2011/12. 
This signals that fiscal revenue is catering for the 
entire recurrent spending, and part of capital 
spending.
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Table 1.1: Kenya’s revenue mobilization fully catering for its recurrent expenditure and part of development
2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12
Total Revenue (KES billion 432.2 487.9 586.4 667.5 748.2
Recurrent spending (KES billion) 403.4 435.5 510.5 592.4 647.1
Revenue to Recurrent spending ratio 1.07 1.12 1.15 1.13 1.16
Source: World Bank calculations based on data from Ministry of Finance
Figure 1.11: Principle sources of government revenue have 
remained the same over the years
Source: World Bank calculations based on data from Ministry of Finance
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The government is constraining the growth of 
its overall spending, but allowing development 
spending to increase.  As revenue underperformed, 
government has rationalized expenditure by 
cutting recurrent spending, but allowing capital 
spending to increase. In 2011/12, government 
spending declined from 29.1 percent of GDP to 
28.9 percent. However, spending cuts were fully 
absorbed by reductions in recurrent budgets (from 
21.2 percent of GDP in 2010/11 to 19.7 percent in 
2011/12), while capital spending increased (from 
7.9 to 9.2 percent of GDP). The fiscal outturn in 
the first half of fiscal year 2012/13 showed an 
overall increase in government expenditure to 
13.4 percent of GDP, compared to 12.5 percent of 
GDP for the same period in 2011/12.
The increased development expenditure 
was directed to infrastructure. Ministry of 
Roads accounted for 25.9 percent of the actual 
ministerial development expenditure. The other 
top beneficiaries of ministerial development 
expenditure were the Ministry of State for 
Planning and National Development and Vision 
2030, which spent 16.27 percent (for CDF 
projects), the Ministry of Finance (7.64 percent for 
LATF-urban investment), Ministry of Energy (7.10 
percent for geothermal power generation), and 
the Ministry of Water and Irrigation (4.06 percent 
for infrastructure). Infrastructure improvements 
are among the key factors that are expected to 
boost Kenya’s economic growth.
Human capital also matters for economic 
development and some restructuring in spending 
on social sectors may be needed. The quantity and 
quality of human capital is determined by health 
and education outcomes. In this regard, health 
and education spending accounts for 2.2 percent 
and 6.4 percent of GDP, respectively. The spending 
on education is comparable or higher than in 
other peer countries, which is good. However, 
education outcomes depend also on the quality of 
service provision, and here there is lot of room for 
improvement, in the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the education system. Health expenditure on 
the other hand would need to be increased—so 
will the efficiency of spending—to be able to meet 
Kenya’s health MDGs.  
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Figure 1.13: Implementation of the budget remains a major challenge
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on Ministry of Finance data
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Figure 1.12: Budget Cuts absorbed by recurrent spending 
while development spending was increased
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on Ministry of Finance data
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A key challenge that continues to follow on 
development expenditure is the low execution 
rate. Poor implementation of the budget affects 
service delivery. The overall rate of absorption 
has remained the same at 72 percent. Recurrent 
expenditure absorption rate was 90.2 percent 
(higher than 84 percent at the end of June 2012), 
and development expenditure absorption rate 
stood at 45.8 percent (compared to 55 percent at 
the end of June 2012).
A new challenge that the budget will face over 
the next three years comes from the devolution 
process.  In line with constitutional obligations, 
the government has allocated KES 210 billion 
in 2013/14 to the counties. These funds are to 
cater for devolved functions, such as agriculture, 
health and infrastructural projects. There are 
two immediate fiscal challenges related to the 
devolution process. First, as Figure 1.14 shows, 
there is wide variance in per capita allocations 
The State of Kenya’s Economy
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Figure 1.14: Per capita allocation for counties shows wide variations
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on Ministry of Finance data
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  Box 1.2: Macroeconomic implications of devolution
The macroeconomic implications of devolution are, in the short-term, primarily fiscal: devolution is likely to 
be costly, significantly increasing total public expenditure by national and county governments compared to pre-
devolution levels. This expansion is likely to be driven by a number of factors:
• The proposed county equitable share (vertical allocation) for 2013/14 is significantly larger than the estimated 
cost of inherited devolved functions in the 2012/13 budget. In the 2012/13 budget, devolved functions to 
be financed by the county equitable share in future years were identified with a “98” code and amounted to 
approximately Ksh 130 billion, not including CDF, which the 2013/14 budget indicates will not be devolved. 
However, the Budget Policy Statement estimates counties should receive 198  billion, including conditional grants. 
Even allowing for inflation (which the BPS estimates at around 16.3 percent for devolved functions between 
2012/13 and 2013/14) this represents a significant increase which is not clearly explained or itemized in the BPS.
• Negotiations around revenue sharing in Parliament suggest these amounts may be increased. The Division 
of Revenue Bill passed by the National Assembly on 9th May increased the allocation to counties to 213 billion 
(including an equitable share of 190 billion) and the Senate has recommended an equitable share of Ksh 238 
billion.  
• The most obvious way to create the fiscal space needed to pay an increased allocation to counties will be to 
reprioritize funds away from national programs.  In many cases, it may be assumed that counties will now absorb 
the cost of these programs.  If counties are not clearly advised which functions they are expected to fund, the 
national budget may have to absorb unbudgeted costs of paying for these services in the short term to avoid 
service collapse.
• It is particularly important that counties understand what salary costs they will be responsible for.  Allocations 
to health, agriculture and other sectors in the national budget suggest these salaries of many staff at county level 
are no longer provided for.
• Redistribution of public resources through the new formula (horizontal allocation) for the distribution of 
the county equitable share is costly. This is because implementing a widely redistributive formula while also 
maintaining historically privileged counties at the funding levels required to sustain their 2012/13 levels of service 
delivery requires extra resources.  The distribution of the equitable share may leave some counties with relatively 
little to spend on development.
• Devolution creates significant new activities (the cost of county assemblies, county executives, the Senate, 
etc.), without proposing many immediate efficiency savings (District treasuries will continue to administer the 
finances of national functions in the counties for example). Counties have yet to have time to explore possible 
efficiency savings that may in the medium- to long-term mean devolution results in lower total spending per 
capita in certain counties due to reduced administrative costs.
• Possible return of seconded staff to national government by counties that either cannot afford to or do not 
want to pay the salaries of employees seconded from the national government in support of devolved functions 
may represent an unbudgeted burden on the national level.
• Subnational investment spending-especially for education and health infrastructure that was formerly financed 
by e.g. the Local Authorities Transfer Fund (LATF)-must now be financed from the county equitable share. Since 
in some counties the equitable share will not be adequate to meet inherited recurrent costs because of the 
distributional impact of the formula, and no additional infrastructure grants are being proposed (although the 
CDF may be maintained as a conditional grant), these counties will either need to suspend investment spending 
or borrow to finance new infrastructure.
• County governments are likely to seek to borrow in order to finance increased expenditures. Although the 
PFM Act sets clear limits on county borrowing, to be determined by the Intergovernmental Budget and Economic 
Council (IBEC) and approved by Parliament, these mechanisms are yet to be set up. Anecdotal evidence regarding 
early draft county budgets for 2013/14 appears to suggest that many draft budgets envisage significant borrowing.
If not carefully managed, these expansionary pressures could undermine Kenya’s hard won macroeconomic stability, 
either by contributing to larger national government fiscal deficits and an increasing debt stock, or by an expansion 
of subnational borrowing which the national government may be expected to guarantee.
Source: World Bank
between counties. Second, the devolution 
formula is different from the previous approach 
to geographical distribution of spending, and will 
lead to large variation between what will be spent 
and what used to be spent. Some counties will 
receive a big boost in funding, while others will face 
substantial cuts. Both cases pose fiscal challenges: 
How to absorb spending in the former? And; How 
to rationalize expenditure in the latter?
1.3 Monetary conditions have eased but 
policy must keep an eye on inflation while 
supporting growth
After an aggressive and successful tightening, the Central Bank of Kenya has reversed gear, 
now that inflation is under control, and cut its 
policy rates to forestall a prolonged economic 
slowdown. The CBK’s action to tighten monetary 
policy in order to fight inflation and stabilize the 
exchange rate, triggered a climb in interest rates, 
which in turn cooled off the economy. As inflation 
has come down below the targeted 5 percent, and 
with inflation expectations anchored at a lower 
level, the CBK reduced the central bank rate (CBR) 
by 950 basis points, signaling the market to lower 
lending rates and ease credit conditions. 
Monetary aggregates are increasing in response to 
the policy easing. Following a significant reduction 
in the growth of monetary aggregates in the first 
half of 2012, monetary aggregates have started 
to increase to reflect CBK’s monetary easing (see 
Figure 1.15). M1’s rate of growth increased from 
2.1 percent in July 2012, to 20 percent in April2013, 
while M2’s growth increased from 13.9 percent to 
18.5 percent in the same period. The growth of 
reserve money, the monetary instrument that CBK 
has direct control over, increased from 6.7 percent 
in October 2012 to 9.5 percent in April 2013. 
The money market rates have also reacted to 
the monetary easing. Short term money market 
interest rates have declined in response to CBK’s 
eased monetary policy. By April 2013, in response 
to the 9.5 percentage points reduction in the CBR, 
the 91 day Treasury bill and the interbank rates 
had declined by 21 and 10.2 percentage points, 
respectively from their peak of 28.9 percent 
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Figure 1.16: Short term rates have responded to monetary policy which seems effective
Source: World Bank Staff calculations based on CBK data
Notes: Interest rates have been transformed by taking a three month moving average used 
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Figure 1.15: Monetary aggregates started increasing in 
response to policy easing in the second half of 2012
Source: World Bank Staff calculations based on CBK data
Notes: Interest rates have been transformed by taking a three month 
moving average used
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Ja
n-
09
Ap
r-
09
Ju
l-0
9
O
ct
-0
9
Ja
n-
10
Ap
r-
10
Ju
l-1
0
O
ct
-1
0
Ja
n-
11
Ap
r-
11
Ju
l-1
1
O
ct
-1
1
Ja
n-
12
Ap
r-
12
Ju
l-1
2
O
ct
-1
2
Ja
n-
13
Ap
r-
13
Gr
ow
th
 (P
er
ce
nt
)
Growth of monetary aggregates (percent)
Reserve Money M0 M1 M2 M3
(November 2011) and 20.56 percent (January 
2012)( see figure 1.16). In addition, unlike what 
happened during the monetary policy tightening 
period when the interbank rates rose above the 
Treasury bill rates, Treasury bill rates are now 
above interbank rates.
Long term interest rates are falling, but at a much 
slower rate. While commercial banks were quick 
to increase their lending rates as CBK tightened 
monetary policy, they have not reacted with 
similar vigor in reducing their lending rates to 
their customers during the monetary easing. The 
average weighted lending rates have only declined 
by 243 basis points in response to 950 basis points 
reduction in the CBR. Overall, the weighted lending 
rates declined from a peak of 20.3 percent in June 
2012 to 17.9 percent in April2013 (see Figure 1.17). 
Average rates paid on three month term deposits 
also declined from 8.25 percent in July 2012 to 
6.4 percent in April2013. Savings rates remained 
unchanged (see Figure 1.17).7  As a result, interest 
rate spread (lending minus deposit rate) remained 
high at 11.5 percent, compared to the pre-tight 
monetary policy level of 10.3 percent.
Business loans bore the brunt of tight monetary 
policy. Commercial banks are pricing business 
loans more expensively than personal/household 
loans, while corporate loans are priced less 
expensively. Before the tight monetary policy 
begun in the last quarter of 2011, commercial 
banks priced personal/household loans more 
expensively than business and corporate loans. 
The State of Kenya’s Economy
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Figure 1.17: Long term rates have remained high but are declining with monetary easing
Source: World Bank Staff calculations based on CBK data. 
Notes: Interest rates have been transformed by taking a three month moving average used 
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Source: World Bank Staff calculations based on CBK data.
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7 Savings deposits are non-term.
However, this changed with the onset of tight 
monetary policy conditions (see Figure 1.18). By 
April 2013, average lending rates on business loans 
were priced at 250 basis points above corporate 
loans, 162 basis points above personal loans. This 
signals the risk by which banks viewed businesses 
in Kenya during an economic downturn and the 
election period. Another interesting observation 
is the pricing of loans based on tenor.8 While 
banks tended to price corporate overdrafts loans 
more expensively compared to 1-5 years tenor, 
the opposite was true with business loans, where 
overdrafts were priced more cheaply compared 
with loans of 1-5 years tenor.
Commercial banks offered high deposit rates to 
counteract CBK’s measures. 
Term deposits increased significantly as 
commercial banks competed for deposits to 
meet statutory liquidity requirements when CBK 
tightened its lending conditions. Average deposit 
rates for all commercial banks increased by 500 
basis points from 3.50 percent in May 2011 to a 
peak of 8.49 percent in May 2012, before falling 
to 6.41 percent in April 2013. This significant 
increase was driven by 0-3 month term deposits 
category, which increased by almost 900 basis 
points from 3.96 percent to 12.87 percent, before 
falling to 8.51 percent in the same period. At the 
same time, term deposits greater than 3 months 
increased by 560 basis points from 5.17 percent to 
10.96 percent, before falling to 9.21 percent.
The private sector suffered a massive credit 
squeeze in 2012. Because of tight monetary 
policy during the first half of 2012, credit to the 
private sector dropped by KES 153.2 billion (a 56 
percent drop) as commercial banks only disbursed 
KES 121.1 billion in 2012, compared to KES 274.3 
billion in 2011. The growth of the credit to the 
private sector declined from 30.9 percent in 2011, 
to 10.4 percent in 2012. There was a significant 
cutback across all sectors of the economy except 
building and construction, which received KES 0.2 
billion more credit in 2012 compared to 2011. 
In terms of the amount of credit, transport and 
communication suffered a KES 39 billion cutback 
in credit in 2012, when compared to 2011, private 
households (KES 26.8 billion), trade (KES 17 billion) 
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Figure 1.19: Commercial banks offered high deposit rates for 
term deposits to attract more liquidity
Source: Central Bank of Kenya, World Bank Staff calculations
Notes: Interest rates have been transformed by taking a three month 
moving average used
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Figure 1.20: Tight monetary policy constrained credit to all sectors of the economy
Source: World Bank Staff calculations based on CBK data
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and real estate (KES 14 billion). The top four credit 
recipients of in 2012 were real estate (20 percent), 
manufacturing (19 percent), trade (17 percent), 
and building and construction (15 percent).  This 
was a slight change from 2011, when the top four 
top credit recipients were private households 
(14.7 percent), real estate (14.1 percent), trade 
(13.6 percent) and manufacturing (12.4 percent).
However, the rate of private sector credit growth 
has been picking up gradually, as bank lending 
conditions eased slowly in 2013. In the first four 
months of 2013, commercial banks have loaned 
out KES 42.3 billion, compared to KES 38.1 billion 
in 2012 (11 percent increase). Majority of the loans 
have been to private households (33.9 percent), 
business loans (33.8 percent) and domestic trade 
(15.3 percent). Credit and activity are propelling 
each other. Credit expansion has continued at 
an elevated pace, and credit-to-GDP ratios have 
continued to move up. However, private sector 
credit remains sluggish, compared to pre-crisis 
level. If the current CBK’s monetary policy stance 
of monetary easing continues, it is expected to 
translate slowly into more dynamic bank lending.
The banking sector remained healthy in 2012, 
despite an environment of tight monetary policy. 
Aggregate balance sheets grew by 15 percent in 
2012. The banking sector’s total assets grew from 
2.0 trillion (66.3 percent of GDP) in December 
2011, to 2.3 trillion (67.7 percent of GDP) in 
December 2012. The main components of the 
banking sector’s assets comprised of loans and 
advances (55.6 percent), government securities 
(17.7 percent) and placements (6.2 percent). 
Despite prevailing high interest rates, the quality 
of banking assets remained resilient. The stock of 
gross non-performing loans (NPLs) increased by 
16.9 percent, from KES 53 billion in 2011, to KES 
62 billion in 2012. As a result, the quality of assets 
deteriorated marginally. Asset quality measured as 
a proportion of net NPLs to gross loans deteriorated 
from 1.2 percent to 1.7 percent, while the ratio 
of gross NPLs to gross loans increased from 4.4 
percent to 4.7 percent over the same period.9  A 
significant portion (67 percent) of the NPLs was in 
personal household category (33.2 percent), trade 
(22.1 percent) and real estate (11.6 percent).
There has been a broad market rally at the NSE 
indicating a reacceleration in activity. The equities 
market is booming with equity prices rising 
strongly. The NSE equity index is up 44 percent 
in the twelve month period through March 2013, 
driven by strong performances across all sectors 
of the market. Kenya’s equities have continued 
to follow the global equity markets into higher 
territory in 2013. In the first 5 months of 2013, the 
NSE has increased by 873 points (21.2 percent), 
while the Dow Jones Industrial Average increased 
by 2011 points (15.3 percent).
1.4 The External Sector poses challenges and 
risks to Kenya’s growth prospects
Kenya’s “external growth engine” remains stifled signaling stagnation or loss in 
competitiveness.  Kenya’s exports as share of GDP 
have remained constant since 2005 (at around 23-
24 percent) while imports have ballooned from 32 
percent in 2005, to 40 percent of GDP in 2012. The 
exports to imports ratio has declined. For every 
US$ 100 worth of imports, exports could pay US$ 
77 of that in 2005.  However, this has reduced to 
US$ 58. Appreciation in the real exchange rate is 
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Figure 1.21: Kenya’s equities are recovering strongly
Source: World Bank Staff calculations based on NSE and Bloomberg data
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an important contributor to the export stagnation. 
The shilling has appreciated by 33 percent, or 3 
percent per annum, in real terms since 2003.10 
Though the nominal exchange rate depreciated 
during this period, Kenya had higher inflation than 
its major trading partners, which in turn led to real 
appreciation, i.e. loss in competitiveness.
The current account continued to deteriorate in 
2012. The current account deficit widened from 
US$ 3.3 billion (9.7 percent of GDP) in 2011, to 
US$ 4.5 billion in 2012 (11.1 percent of GDP). 
This reflected the combination of subdued export 
demand from Kenya’s trading partners in Europe, 
and strong import demand fueled by the growth 
in capital imports. 
Kenya’s current account has deteriorated sharply 
as exports have stagnated, while imports 
increased. The share of Kenya’s exports in GDP has 
remained constant since 2005, while the share of 
Kenya’s imports has increased. Specifically, exports 
marginally declined from 24.3 percent in 2005, to 
23.1 percent of GDP in 2012, while at the same 
time imports as share of GDP increased from 32 
percent to 40 percent. Though a significant portion 
of the increase of imports can be attributed to 
the oil bill and increased imports of machinery, 
transport goods and other intermediate goods, 
the appreciation in the real exchange (discussed 
below) has contributed to the problem. More 
recently, the deterioration in the current account 
reflected an increase in non-oil imports by 13.8 
percent to US$ 12.2b in 2012, from US$ 10.7 in 
2011. Crude oil imports were not a major factor 
driving the current account deficit in 2012, as 
the oil bill remained the same as in 2011 at US$ 
4.1 billion. Capital imports were a major factor, 
increasing by 29 percent from US$ 3.7billion to 
US$ 4.9 billion. 
The overall balance of payments returned to 
surplus in 2012. The overall balance moved from 
a small deficit in 2011 to a large surplus in 2012, 
on the back of strong net short term flows and 
project loans (including defense loans). The overall 
balance of payments improved from a deficit of 
US$ 0.04 billion (0.1 percent) in 2011 to a surplus 
of US$ 1.4 b (3.0 percent of GDP) in 2012, mainly 
the result of an increase in project loans from US$ 
0.6 b to US$ 1.4 billion. The basic balance (current 
account balance plus net direct investment)11 
remained negative, implying a continued reliance 
on potentially volatile portfolio investment, which 
signals that Kenya continues to remain vulnerable 
to external shocks (see Figure 1.22).
The balance of trade deteriorated further in 
2012, reflecting strong capital import demand 
coupled with weak commodity exports.  The non-
oil trade balance deteriorated slightly to US$ -2.8b 
(6.91 percent of GDP) in 2012, from US$ -2.4b 
(6.89 percent of GDP) in 2011, while the deficit in 
the balance of trade including oil increased to US$ 
6.9b (16.9 percent of GDP), from US$ 6.4b (18.8 
percent of GDP) in the same period (see Figure 
1.23). Turning to a more detailed view of recent 
trade dynamics, in 2012 the merchandise account 
deficit increased from US$ 9b (26.8 percent of 
GDP) in 2011, to US$ 10.4b (25.1 percent of GDP) 
in 2012. Total imports growth moderated from a 
growth of 19.5 percent in 2011, to 10.0 percent in 
2012, to reach US$ 16.3b (40.3 percent of GDP). 
Capital goods imports grew by 29 percent from 
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Figure 1.22: A wider current account deficit is being financed 
by short term flows
Source: World Bank Staff calculations based on CBK data
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10 Nominal exchange rate is the amount of Kenyan shillings that can purchase a unit of a given foreign currency (e.g. a US dollar). A decrease in this 
variable is termed nominal appreciation of the currency while an increase is termed nominal depreciation of the currency. Real exchange rates are 
nominal exchange rate that has been adjusted for the difference in inflation between Kenya and its trading partners.
US$ 3.7b to US$ 4.9b, while imports of crude 
oil remained flat in 2012 at US$ 4.08b, same as 
in 2011. Exports of goods grew by 5.5 percent 
to reach US$ 6.2b (15.1 percent), from US$ 5.8b 
(17.3 percent of GDP) in the same period. This 
underperformance of exports is explained by poor 
performance in Kenya’s main export crops. Tea and 
horticulture grew by only 4 percent and 2 percent 
respectively in 2012. Strong performance in the 
transportation account and other government 
services saw non-factor services grow 27 by 
percent in 2012, from US$ 2.6billion to US$ 3.2 
billion. Overall exports of goods and services for 
2012 increased by 12.2 percent to reach US$ 9.4b 
(23.2 percent of GDP), up from US$ 8.4b (24.9 
percent of GDP), in nominal USD terms.
Despite its potential, Kenya is still not attracting 
adequate long term capital inflows to power 
its growth. Kenya receives less long term capital 
inflows than any other country in the EAC region. 
According to CBK balance of payment data, official 
medium and long terms flows, which are mainly 
project loans (including defense loans), increased 
from US$ 527 million in 2010, to US$ 612 million 
in 2011,  and then to US$ 1,449 million in 2012. 
However, foreign direct investment (FDI) remained 
subdued, as Kenya received only US$ 177 million 
(2010), US$ 140 million (2011) and US$ 164 million 
(2012) according to CBK data. UNCTAD data on 
the other hand shows that Kenya received US$ 
178.1 million (2010) and US$ 335 million (2011) 
in FDI. Kenya’s performance in attracting foreign 
investment remains limited compared to its peers. 
The FDI Kenya attracted was only equivalent to 
0.8 percent of its GDP in 2010-11, compared 
to Rwanda (1.2 percent of GDP), Tanzania (2.8 
percent of GDP), and Uganda (6.2 percent of GDP) 
in the same period (see Figure 1.24). However, 
following the recent peaceful elections, and given 
the improvements in the governance framework 
since the new Constitution was adopted in 2010, 
FDI to Kenya is expected to increase in the future.
Kenya has not been an attractive destination of 
FDI. A variety of factors explain low FDI in Kenya (i) 
infrastructure bottlenecks both in energy and roads 
have been a major constraint on FDI. For Kenya 
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Figure 1.24: FDI inflows into Kenya remains low compared to its peers in the region while Short term
 flows have increased significantly
Source: World Bank Staff calculations based on CBK and UNCTAD data
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Figure 1.23: Non-oil imports mainly capital imports increased 
significantly in 2012 while oil imports remained flat 
Source: World Bank Staff calculations based on CBK data
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11   Even if we defined basic balance as current account deficit plus non short term capital, it still remains negative, further demonstrating Kenya’s 
vulnerability.
to be an attractive destination for FDI, it requires 
infrastructure to facilitate the production activities 
and sale of goods and services. Good infrastructure 
lowers the transaction costs, which enable 
investors to earn returns on their investments, as 
their enterprises are able to generate profits. This 
constraint has been recognized by the government 
as a larger proportion of Kenya’s budget is now 
allocated to roads and energy sector. (ii) Kenya’s 
labor productivity has been falling in the recent 
past, while at the same time, labour costs have 
been rising fast compared to their productivity. 
(iii) The regulatory environment in Kenya has 
been hostile to FDI and impeded it. Excessive 
regulations have hindered entrepreneurial 
activity, as firms spend more time and resources 
complying with rules and regulations. The long 
delays in resolving disputes in the judiciary and 
other cumbersome compliance items, have 
discouraged FDI. In addition, the regulations that 
require foreign firms to enter into mandatory joint 
ventures partnerships (30 percent share) with 
locals in order to invest in Kenya, makes it a less 
favorable investment destination.
Short term flows continue to dominate Kenya’s 
balance of payments, and expose the economy’s 
vulnerability to sudden reversals. Short term 
flows including errors and omissions increased 
from US$ 2 billion (6.1 percent of GDP) in 2010 
to US$ 4.3 billion (9 percent of GDP) in 2012. 
Excluding the errors and omissions, short terms 
flows increased from US$ 1.1 billion (3.5 percent of 
GDP) to US$ 2.4 billion (5.8 percent of GDP) in the 
same period. The critical importance of short term 
flows in financing the current account is detected 
when its contribution to the capital and financial 
account is analyzed (see Figure 1.25). Short term 
flows (including errors and omissions) constitute 
63.5 percent of net capital and financial account. 
This was a significant decline from 87.9 percent 
in 2011, which is accounted for by US$ 1.2 billion 
in the project loans (including defense loans) 
that were recorded in 2012. Portfolio inflows are 
mostly for investment in the equities and bond 
markets, where returns have been very high since 
the onset of global financial crisis in 2008. Strong 
net portfolio investment inflows were in line with 
a solid domestic government bond and stock 
market performance, which occurred at a time 
when the global risk appetite was improving, and 
interest rates in advanced and emerging markets 
were low.
 Kenya remains exposed to a reduction in shorter-
term capital flows in the event of heightened 
uncertainty on global financial markets. The 
current account deficit is expected to widen 
further, as the economy expands, after the 
general elections. Moreover, imports of heavy 
machinery and transportation equipment, which 
are important for infrastructure projects and 
oil and gas exploration, are expected to grow in 
2013. Kenya runs a risk, if it continues to depend 
on short term flows that uncertainties in global 
financial markets could undermine its ability to 
finance the current account deficit. Kenya would 
benefit from increased long term flows and FDI, 
to substitute for some of the short term flows that 
are more vulnerable to uncertainties in the global 
capital markets.  
The Central Bank of Kenya has built a large 
enough buffer to cushion the economy in the 
event of external shock. The CBK increased its 
holding of international reserves by US$ 1.5 billion 
(36 percent) in 2012, from US$ 4.2b in 2011 to 
The State of Kenya’s Economy
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Figure 1.25: Short term flows has become a significant factor 
in the balance of payment
Source: World Bank Staff calculations based on CBK data
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US$ 5.7b. The import cover increased from 3.7in 
December 2011 to 4.3 in 2012, which is above the 
statutory requirement of 4 months. 
Kenya’s structure of exports and imports has 
not changed in the last 5 years. Machinery and 
transport equipment constitute the largest share 
of imports accounting for about 30 percent, while 
oil imports take a 25 percent share. Variations in oil 
imports are driven by price fluctuations. Imports 
of machinery and transport equipment tend to 
expand the economy’s productive capacity, and 
are beneficial to Kenya’s long term growth (see 
Table 1.2). 
 
Exports remained weak in 2012. Weak external 
demand for Kenya’s exports was as a result of 
subdued global demand, and lower commodity 
prices. Tea remains the major contributor to 
merchandise exports earnings, bringing in about 20 
percent of total earnings, followed by horticulture 
and manufactured goods, which each contributed 
about 11 percent in 2012. While tea earnings 
have increased from 17 percent in 2007 to 20 
percent in 2012, export earnings have declined for 
horticulture from 15 percent in 2007 to 11 percent 
in 2012, in the face of subdued demand in Europe. 
The largest destination of Kenya’s exports is Africa, 
where 48 percent of its exports go with 26 percent 
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Table 1.2: Kenya’s top exports and imports by broad functional category
Selected Exports
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Coffee (%) 4 3 4 4 4 4 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7
Tea (%) 17 18 20 22 20 20 2.5 3.0 2.9 3.6 3.4 3.0
Horticulture (%) 15 15 15 14 12 11 2.2 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.0 1.7
Manufactured Goods (%) 12 12 12 12 13 11 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2
Selected Imports (%)
As a share of Total imports As a share of GDP
Oil (%) 21 27 21 22 28 25 7.0 10.0 7.2 8.3 12.1 10.1
Chemicals (%) 13 13 13 13 13 13 4.2 4.7 4.3 5.0 5.8 5.1
Manufactured Goods (%) 16 14 14 14 15 14 5.3 5.2 4.6 5.5 6.7 5.7
Machinery & Transport 
Equipment (%)
31 27 30 31 25 29 10.3 10.1 10.0 11.8 11.0 11.7
Selected Exports (%)
As a share of Total Exports As a share of GDP
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Coffee 4.03 3.07 4.45 3.99 3.82 4.39 0.61 0.51 0.66 0.65 0.66 0.66
Tea 16.76 18.30 19.69 22.17 19.86 19.57 2.54 3.03 2.92 3.60 3.43 2.97
Horticulture 14.70 15.12 15.29 13.88 11.67 11.34 2.23 2.51 2.26 2.25 2.02 1.72
Manufactured Goods 12.42 12.38 11.62 11.63 12.55 11.43 0.59 0.38 0.31 0.28 0.35 0.20
Selected Imports  (%)
As a share of Total imports As a share of GDP
Oil 21.17 26.55 21.29 21.56 27.55 25.05 7.05 10.02 7.17 8.30 12.14 10.09
Chemicals 12.74 12.58 12.86 12.93 13.15 12.74 4.24 4.75 4.33 4.98 5.79 5.13
Manufactured Goods 15.83 13.83 13.70 14.31 15.19 14.13 5.27 5.22 4.61 5.51 6.69 5.69
Machinery & Transport 
Equipment
30.87 26.65 29.77 30.72 24.88 29.15 10.28 10.05 10.02 11.83 10.96 11.74
Source: World Bank Staff calculations based on CBK data
going to East African Community. The EU is Kenya’s 
second main trading partner and accounts for 24 
percent of it’s exports, of which 7.8 percent goes 
to the UK.  As such, even though the economic 
situation in Europe affects Kenya’s exports, more 
than three quarters of its trading partners have 
not seen an economic crisis similar to what has 
been happening in Europe in the past few years.
The exchange rate stabilized in 2012. The Kenya 
shilling in December 2012 traded at KES 85.99 
against the US$ (compared with KES 86.66 in 
December 2011). This represented a 0.8 percent 
nominal appreciation against the US$. Taking a 
long term perspective, between January 2003 
and December 2012, the shilling has depreciated 
by 11.8 percent, 10.5 percent and 39.8 percent, 
respectively against the US$, the Sterling Pound 
and the Euro. As such, the average annual rate 
of depreciation was 1.2 percent, 1.1 percent and 
4 percent per annum, respectively in the period. 
The rate of depreciation has been much lower 
when compared to Kenya’s inflation rate during 
the period, which averaged 9.6 percent per annum 
in the last 10 years. Between December 2012 and 
April 2013, the shilling had appreciated in nominal 
terms by 2.1, 7.2 and 2.8 percent against the US 
Dollar, the Sterling Pound and the Euro mainly on 
The State of Kenya’s Economy
Table 1.3: Selected Kenya’s Trading Partners
Top 10 Exports Destination Top 10 Origin of Imports (country of origin
US$ (Million)
Percent of
 Total Exports
US$ (Million)
Percent of 
Total Exports
1. Uganda 67,450 13.0 India 195,230 14.0
2. Tanzania 46,036 8.9 China 167,206 12.2
3. UK 40,630 7.8 UAE 149,879 10.9
4. Netherlands 31,056 6.0 Saudi Arabia 66,841 4.9
5. UAE 28,608 5.5 USA 65,966 4.8
6. USA 26,405 5.1 Japan 63,135 4.6
7. Pakistan 23,889 4.6 South Africa 61,954 4.5
8. Egypt 21,464 4.1 Indonesia 55,241 4.0
Rwanda 16,151 3.1 UK 43,849 3.2
9. Germany 9,771 1.9 Germany 41,474 3.0
Total 517,847 60.1 1,374,587 66.3
1. Africa 250,589 48.4 Asia 856,525 62.3
2. Europe 125,195 24.2 Middle East 284,117 20.7
3. Asia 105,460 20.4 Far East 572,408 41.6
4. Middle east 42,065 8.1 Europe 249,769 18.2
5. Far East 63,395 12.2 Africa 140,755 10.2
6. EAC 134,946 26.1 EAC 30,857 2.2
7. COMESA 175,732 33.9 COMESA 61,572 4.5
Source: KNBS, Economic Survey 2013
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14 Nominal exchange rate can be defined as the amount of Kenya shillings that can purchase a unit of a given foreign currency. A decrease in this 
variable is termed nominal appreciation of the currency while an increase is termed nominal depreciation of the currency. Real exchange rates 
are nominal exchange rate that has been adjusted for the different rates of inflation between Kenya shillings and a foreign currency. In practice, 
changes of the real exchange rate rather than its absolute level are important. An increase in the real exchange rate is termed depreciation while 
a decrease is depreciation. The importance stems from the fact that it can be used as an indicator of competitiveness in the foreign trade of a 
country.
15  Long-run equilibrium real exchange rate is the real rate that, for given values of “economic fundamentals” (openness, productivity differentials, 
terms of trade, public expenditure, direct foreign investment, international interest rates, etc.) is compatible with simultaneous achievement of 
internal and external equilibrium. For methods to estimate long-run real equilibrium exchange rate, see Hinkle and others 1999.
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  Box 1.3: Could the deprecation of the Kenyan shilling be beneficial to Kenya’s economy? Evidence from the literature
Recent studies on Kenya have shown that import price elasticity of demand is greater than unity. This implies that import 
demand in Kenya is fairly elastic. In other words, as relative prices fall import demand will increase by a greater than proportional 
amount.
Even though Kenya’s aggregate price elasticity of demand indicates that imports would respond to the shillings depreciation, there 
is a very wide disparity across sectors as depicted in Table 2. From the studies by Jones (2003), 10 percent depreciation of the 
shilling would lead to 28.2 percent reduction in rubber and hinds, 24 percent in Footwear and headgear, 20 percent in precision 
instruments etc. However, capital goods, chemicals and vehicles and transport would fall less than proportionately
The response of exports to depreciation would be weak in the short run. According to recent studies Kenya’s export supply 
elasticities are in the range of 0.28-0.60 in the short run and 0.33 -0.88 in the long run (see Broda et al (2008) and Tovarick (2010). 
If these elastcitites are correct, then a 10 percent depreciation will elicit less than proportionate export supply response.
Lastly, using import demand and export supply elasticities from various studies, Tovarick (2010) calculated Kenya’s trade 
balance elaticities to range from 0.46 in domestic currency and 0.56 in foreign currency. According to this study, a 10 percent 
depreciation of the shilling will improve the trade balance by 4.6 percent in domestic currency terms or 5.6 percent in foreign 
currency terms.
Source: World Bank
Aggregate price elasticity of demand estimates for Kenya13
Jones 
(2003)
Tokarick 
(2010)
Kee et al 
(2008)
Faini (1988) Senhadji 
(1977)
Bruce/Ndii 
(1994)
Aggregate Import price Elasticity -1.148 -1.33 -1.14 -1.48 -1.45
Import price elasticity of demand for Kenya sectors
Sector Sector Elasticity Sector Sector Elasticity
1. Rubber and Hides -2.82 9. Mineral Products -1.32
2. Footwear and Headgear etc -2.42 10. stones, Pearls Glass etc -1.29
3. Precision Instruments -2.01 11. Beverages and Tobacco -0.99
4. Base metals -1.93 12. Miscellaneous Manufactures -0.95
5. Textiles and Garments -1.76 13. Vehicles and Transport Equipment -0.88
6. Live animals -1.58 14. Arms and Munitions -0.63
7. Wood and Paper Products -1.54 15. Chemicals -0.53
8. Vegetable products -1.51 16. Machinery and Electrical Equipment 0.22
Source: Jones C. (2003)
13   Kee, H. L. Nicita A., and Olarreaga (2008): Import Demand Elastcities and Trade distortions” Review of Economics and Statistics Vol 90, No4, pp 666-
682 Senhadji, Semlali 1997: Time series of Structural Import demand Equations- A cross country Analysis, IMF Working Paper WP/97/132  Jones 
C (2003): Aggregate and Sector Import Price Elastcities for a sample of African Countries’ CREDIT Research Paper No 08/03 Tokarick S (2010): A 
Method for Calculating Export Supply and Import Demand Elasticities, IMF Working Paper WP/10/108.
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account of peaceful  transition of power which 
had reduced political risk.
On the other hand, the persistently higher 
inflation vis-à-vis its trading partners, points to an 
appreciation in the real exchange rate, i.e. erosion 
in Kenya’s competitiveness. The evolution of the 
real exchange rate over the last decade, shows a 
trend of real appreciation. Between January 2003 
and April 2013, the Kenya shilling appreciated by 
37 percent in real terms, cumulatively representing 
an annual appreciation of about three percent.12 
13  Hence, despite the nominal depreciation of 
the shilling, Kenya’s inflation was higher than in 
partner countries, which, in turn, implies that 
the competitiveness of Kenya’s export products 
eroded relative to the domestically produced 
products in those countries.
The high inflation in 2011 caused a big real 
appreciation of the shilling. The real effective 
exchange rate (REER) appreciated by 7.8 percent 
in 2011, and by 14.9 percent between the end of 
September and the end of December 2011. Up to 
2011, the REER had been relatively stable for about 
4 years and appeared to be in line with economic 
fundamentals. IMF’s Article IV report of January 
which looked at data up to the end of Q3 of 2011 
found “no significant evidence of exchange rate 
misalignment”.  This assessment was made using 
three model approaches: the macroeconomic 
balance, the external sustainability, and the 
equilibrium real exchange rate assessment. 
However, between the end of September 2011 
(latest data used in the Article IV) and January 
2013, the REER appreciated by 21.5 percent, which 
points to weakened export competitiveness.
Fig 1.26: The exchange rate stabilized in 2012 but has depreciated at the rate of 1-4 percent per year
 in nominal terms in the last 10 years against the major currencies 
Source: World Bank Staff calculations based on CBK data
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2003 and December 30, 2013 the nominal depreciation of the shilling
was 11.8%, 10.5% and 39.8% against the US dolar, the UK sterling pound and the EURO.
*Between Jan,
*  The Kenya shilling has lost 40% of its value against
    the euro, and about 10% gainst the sterling and the US dollar
Figure 1.27: Kenya competitiveness continues to be eroded 
Source: World Bank Staff calculations based on CBK data
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Figure 1.28: Remittances have risen sharply in the last few years
World Bank Staff calculations based on CBK data
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Kenya is experiencing a boom in remittances, 
surpassing US$ 1 billion for the first time in 2012. 
Remittances increased from US $ 642 million (2.0 
percent of GDP) in 2010 to US$ 891 million (2.65 
percent of GDP) in 2011, to US$ 1.2 million (2.9 
percent of GDP) in 2012. Monthly average inflows 
have increased by 82 percent in just 2 years to 
US$ 97.6 million in 2012, from US$ 54 million in 
2010 (see Figure 1.28).  North America is the main 
source of the remittances (48 percent) followed 
by Europe (28 percent) and the rest of the world 
(24 percent). The recent increase in remittances is 
explained both by better data collection methods 
employed by the CBK, and by the ease by which 
the diaspora can now send remittances to Kenya 
via commercial banks for investment purposes.
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2.1 Growth prospects
Kenya’s economic prospects have improved 
following the peaceful elections in March 2013, 
and subsequent transfer of power. The World 
Bank forecasts growth to reach 5.7 percent in 
2013 and 6 percent in 2014. This will be the 
highest growth since 2007, when the economy 
grew by 7 percent. Aggregate demand fueled by 
strong consumption and investment growth will 
power the economy forward. Growth in the first 
half of 2013 was subdued due to election jitters, 
when activity stalled by a wait-and-see attitude 
to new investment. Starting in the second half of 
2013, growth will gradually accelerate, as demand 
firms up and overall economic activity picks up 
steam. The baseline scenario is one of a recovery 
in credit flows, to the economy supporting an 
investment led recovery. Government is assumed 
to maintain a prudent fiscal stance, and hence, 
seek to consolidate fiscal policy in the outer years 
of the forecast. Expenditures will still expand, 
but not like in the pre-election year. Exports are 
assumed to grow in line with the strengthening 
of the economies of Kenya’s trading partners. 
And imports are dependent on the strength of 
domestic demand, particularly for capital goods. 
The World Bank forecasts accelerated growth 
in the second half of 2013, driven by private 
sector net lending and strong performance in 
the booming agricultural sector. Kenya’s growth 
outlook for 2013 closely mirrors projected SSA 
average growth of 4.9 percent (5.6 percent for 
oil importing countries), but continues to be 
lower than other EAC member states, which are 
estimated to grow at 6.1 percent in 2013.
In a high case scenario, Kenya’s GDP growth is 
projected to reach 6.1 percent in 2013. Under 
this scenario, investment outturns are much 
stronger than in the baseline, due to stronger than 
expected inflows of foreign direct investment, 
and ongoing peace dividends. Macros stability 
is sustained, with agriculture harvests being 
favorable, thereby supporting household incomes. 
Much of the increased investments is also used for 
the purchase of imported equipment, thus leading 
to a stronger than expected growth in imports.
Figure 2.1:A pickup in growth in 2013-14
Source: World Bank staff calculations
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Table 2.1: Macroeconomic Indicators 2008-2014
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013** 2014** 2015**
GDP 2.7 5.8 4.4 4.6 5.7 5.9 5.5
Private Consumption 5.0 7.2 3.0 5.5 2.9 3.1 2.8
Government Consumption 3.8 6.3 5.2 9.3 4.6 3.7 3.0
Gross Fixed Investment 2.8 7.7 12.6 11.5 12.1 15.0 13.2
Exports, GNFS -9.3 17.4 6.6 4.7 5.4 6.4 6.7
Imports, GNFS 2.8 6.1 15.6 12.5 5.8 8.0 7.7
Source: World Bank Staff calculations
** - Forecasts
2. Growth Outlook for 2013-2014
In the low case scenario, GDP growth could 
remain at below potential as macroeconomic 
instability induced by the realization of risks in 
Kenya’s current account deficits (fast depreciating 
shilling), as well as overheating from excess 
liquidity (high inflation), both of which combine 
to reduce investment activity and consumer 
spending. Government and export activities are 
assumed to be less affected, however, imports are 
also reduced.
With inflation no longer being a significant threat, 
the Central Bank’s softer monetary policy stance 
has stimulated aggregate demand and growth. To 
stimulate economic activity, the Central Bank has 
been easing the monetary policy since the second 
half of 2012, by lowering the CBR to 8.5 percent 
from 18 percent by May 2013. Commercial banks 
have started to ease their rates, with the average 
lending trending downwards. The impact of 
CBK’s action is already evident, as credit growth 
has been increasing since November 2012, and 
is expected to accelerate in the second and third 
quarter as of 2013, as borrowers respond to lower 
lending rates. Within 6 months leading to April 
2013, credit grew by 132 percent with commercial 
banks having lent KES 74 billion compared to 32 
billion in the same period in 2012. Most of the 
credit went to private households (22 percent), 
business activity (19 percent), domestic trade (18 
percent), and manufacturing (18 percent).
A combination of accommodative monetary 
stanceand rapid credit growth will spur 
consumption and private investment in 2013. 
Domestic demand growth may be higher than 
projected, supported by strong capital inflows and 
eased financing conditions. With economic activity 
and capital inflows accelerating, lenders are 
expected to ease credit conditions, further driving 
up aggregate demand. The World Bank expects a 
sharp pick up in private consumption during the 
second half of 2013, driven by sharp increase in 
credit and increased gross investment,as investors 
rush to implement plans which have been on hold 
waiting for the new government to be in place. 
Domestic demand will continue to power Kenya’s 
GDP growth, with public infrastructure investment 
playing a leading role. The drag on growth 
from net exports will ease, as global economic 
conditions improve. Inflationary pressures should 
remain in check, and Kenya can expect to receive 
continued inflows of short term capital into its 
fixed income securities and equities market. Prices 
in the equities market have increased significantly 
in the first quarter of 2013, and should this 
continue, it will inspire consumption as a result of 
the increasing wealth effect. In addition, with the 
discovery of oil and gas reserves, Kenya will attract 
higher FDI flows to finance exploration in 2013, 
and these flows will continue into the medium 
term.
Macroeconomic policies are expected to remain 
generally accommodative to support growth. 
As the supply side constraints in agriculture ease 
due to adequate rainfall, the government will 
try to balance fighting inflation and supporting 
growth. Even though inflationary pressure has 
moderated with core inflation subdued, inflation 
is expected to edge upwards as private demand 
picks up. Inflation could move above the 5 percent 
medium term target in the second half of 2013, 
without necessarily triggering a CBR hike, provided 
medium-term inflation expectations remain well 
anchored. This may help bring down lending 
rates. With monetary policy space available, the 
deleterious effects of an easy monetary policy 
Figure 2.2: Monetary policy space is available
to support growth
Source: World Bank Staff calculations based on CBK data
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triggering high inflation in the near term are 
reduced. In addition, fiscal consolidation would 
reduce the pressure on the external account and 
mitigate the impact of the appreciation of the real 
exchange rates. Moreover, the shift of spending 
from urban towards rural counties envisaged 
under the devolution processmay contribute to 
economic growth, as the multiplier effects of 
additional spending are expected to be greater in 
rural areas.
2.2  Risks to outlook
Kenya’s short-term risk picture improved remarkably at the end of first quarter, 
following the successful elections and the 
peaceful transition of power. The main risks to the 
growth outlook for Kenya stem from: (i) continued 
high current account deficit; (ii) inflationary risks 
associated with monetary easing to stimulate 
growth and increases in electricity prices; (iii) poor 
implementation of the budget affecting service 
delivery; (iv) security threats from terrorists; and, 
(iv) fiscal risks associated with the devolution 
process and demands for higher salaries of public 
officials, could fuel inflation further.
The high current account deficit continues to pose 
a risk and vulnerability to Kenya’s macroeconomic 
stability. Kenya’s large and persistent current 
account deficit of over 10 percent of GDP in the 
last three years, raises a major concern for Kenya’s 
sustained economic growth. The short term 
flows which Kenya relies on to finance the deficit 
could become volatile, triggering a disorderly 
adjustment. Moreover, the current account deficit 
is bound to stay high, driven by high capital imports 
and high investment demand. In addition, the 
weak and subdued demand for Kenya’s exports in 
its traditional European markets will remain a drag 
on Kenya’s current account, as euro zone battles 
recession.
Inflationary risk associated with monetary easing 
to stimulate growth needs to be taken seriously. 
The easing of monetary policy will trigger 
significant demand for private sector credit, as 
lending and economic activity propel each other 
forward. In addition, further easing of credit 
conditions will reaccelerate economic activity. 
The provision of interest free loans to youth and 
women, as pledged by the new administration 
during the election period, if implemented 
without careful targeting, could pose problems 
for the monetary authorities. The advantages 
of credit growth to power economic activity 
should be assessed against the risks of generating 
inflationary pressures. As figure 2.3 shows, private 
sector growth and inflation are strongly correlated. 
As highlighted in previous edition of the Kenya 
Economic Update, the key lesson learned through 
the 2011 crisis, is the need for policymakers to 
react fast to anchor market expectations and 
prioritize the fight to reign in on inflation, as a 
necessary condition to assure sustained growth. 
As such, gradualism in monetary policy easing is a 
more preferred approach.
Demands for more public spending pose a fiscal 
risk. There are several demands to increase public 
spending. First the demand to hire over 100,000 
additional teachers, despite studies indicating 
a high rate of class absenteeism of up to 36 
percent poses a fiscal risk for Kenya. The national 
teachers union has also called for mass promotion 
of its members along with hardship allowances, 
which are at variance with notional government 
budget allocations. Secondly, demands by elected 
representatives at national and county levels 
Figure 2.3: A close relationship between Inflation and 
credit to private sector
Source: World Bank Staff calculations based on CBK and KNBS data
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to be paid salaries at rates way above those 
recommended by the Salaries and Remunerations 
Commission (SRC) will significantly drive up the 
wage bill. Thirdly, there are still unresolved issues 
associated with devolution, which have fiscal 
implications and need to be sorted out without 
threatening the public sector wage bill, including: 
(i) the integration of local authorities’ staff with 
civil servants whose national functions have been 
decentralized to the counties; and, (ii) emerging 
demands among public servants for higher wages. 
Other risks are also present. Security threats 
from Al Shaabab and the Mombasa Republican 
Council (MRC) are hurting the tourism industry 
and investment in the coastal region, and parts of 
Nairobi. The activities of these insurgent groups 
have led to tourist cancelations and might deter 
investors from investing in Mombasa, Kenya’s 
second largest city. Secondly, the proposed 
increase of over 100 percent in electricity tariff 
planned to take effect in 2013, will increase the 
cost of doing business in Kenya for manufacturing 
industries. Electricity costs 
in Kenya are already high, 
when compared to Kenya’s 
competitors in this sector. A 
huge increase in electricity 
tariff will hurt business for 
those in the export sector.
2.3  Important priorities for 
the near and medium 
term
The key challenge for the medium term remains boosting productivity and regaining 
competitiveness. To maintain high growth 
rates, Kenya needs to continue investing more 
in infrastructure and human capital, improve 
the business and regulatory environment, and 
diversify exports. Strong import growth, lackluster 
export growth, and an appreciating real effective 
exchange rate, are driving the growing current 
account deficit. The challenge for Kenya is to 
engineer policies to boost productivity growth and 
foster job creation, i.e. reinvigorate both engines 
of the economy. The best way to achieve this is 
to maintain macroeconomic stability, to develop a 
business environment that promotes investment 
and job creation, and to increase the stock of 
physical and human capital.
Developments in exchange rate suggest that 
Kenya’s real effective exchange rates are far 
from levels consistent with medium-term 
fundamentals. Kenya’s real exchange rate has 
appreciated strongly in the last decade, and this 
has been accompanied by the deterioration of 
thecurrent account balance. For any exchange 
rate regime to remain stable and competitive, 
real exchange rates require a supportive policy 
environment, which would include prudent 
macroeconomic policies and a strong financial 
sector. 
Kenya’s policy makers have to confront the 
challenge of managing the surge in short term 
capital flows and the associated vulnerabilities 
to a sudden reversal of the inflows. 
In recent years Kenya’s economy has 
benefited from large short term flows 
attracted by the open capital account, 
one of the most vibrant bond and fixed 
income securities markets in Africa, 
as well as the underlying strength and 
potential of the domestic economy.
However, strong capital inflows have 
contributed to the appreciation of the 
real exchange rate.
Foreign Direct Investment is key to Kenya’s 
development agenda. Since domestic savings are 
low, attracting FDI would supplement domestic 
savings in financing Kenya’s growth agenda. 
Kenya should aggressively seek more productivity 
enhancing FDI to diversify its economy and develop 
its private sector, encouraging technology transfer 
to sharpen its competitive edge in the external 
market. Kenya needs strong judicial institutions to 
resolve conflicts, enforce contract disputes, and 
ensure a level playing field for investors. Political 
Since domestic savings 
are low, attracting FDI 
would supplement 
domestic savings in 
financing Kenya’s 
growth agenda, 
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  Box 2.1:  Higher savings for faster growth
The economic literature finds that domestic savings are crucial a component for high and sustainable growth in 
open developing economies. Economic developments of the past few decades confirm the theoretical findings. The 
Growth Report (2009), which analyzes the factors behind the 13 most successful economies in the post-World War 
II period, illustrates the importance of high investment for achieving rapid growth. The common feature of these 
“success stories” is that they had relatively high saving rates at the beginning and during their “high growth episode”. 
High savings rates are particularly common in East Asia -the fastest growing region of the world. The average savings 
rate in East Asia during the 2000s was 30 percent of GDP, compared to the global average of about 19 percent. 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is the poorest region of the world and also has the lowest-though rapidly increasing-rate 
of saving. SSA’s average savings rate has gone from 10 percent of GDP in the 1990s to 14 percent of GDP during the 
2000s, and by 2011 it reached 17 percent of GDP.
Kenya’s savings rate has not followed the same trend as the rest of SSA. The savings rate has been lingering around 
13-14 percent of GDP over the last five years, and is much lower than the average for low income countries (26 
percent of GDP). In contrast, neighboring Uganda and Tanzania have already passed the 20 percent mark even though 
their GNI per capita is less than $550 compared to Kenya’s $820.  
Kenya has succeeded to attain the same investment rate as SSA (17 percent of GDP) with lower rate of savings, 
partly owing to higher inflows of foreign savings. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to reach the needed investment 
rate to meet the Vision 2030’s development goal by relying solely on foreign savings. Uganda and even more so 
Tanzania have achieved remarkable investment rates, and high savings rates are a big contributor to this success.
Increasing Kenya’s savings rate will not by itself lead to the desired 10 percent annual GDP growth rate. Higher 
foreign investment is necessary in order to bring superior technologies and know-how into the country. More 
importantly, unless Kenya’s economy realizes progress in productivity –which is currently constrained by numerous 
factors such as poor infrastructure and weak governance- the desired economic development will not be achieved 
even with the most ambitious savings efforts.
Source: World Bank
Figure 2.4: Savings and GNI per capita (2011)
Source: World Bank
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Figure 2.5: Savings and investment, as at GDP (2011)
Source: World Bank
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stability is also an important factor in attracting 
FDI, and in providing longer term investment 
horizons. 
Increasing investment will also need to rely on 
higher domestic savings. While FDI is beneficial 
and should be promoted, achieving the investment 
rate needed for sustainable 
rapid growth will require higher 
propensity to save (see Box 2.1). 
Savings in Kenya are low compared 
to other countries in the region, 
and far from the levels of fast-
growing countries (in particular in 
East Asia).
The ultimate objective of Kenya’s 
development strategy is to 
make it more inclusive. The 
new administration promises to 
make growth more inclusive. This can only be 
done through reforms to promote economic 
diversification and job creation, tackling 
infrastructure gaps, and enhancing the human 
capital and productivity of the poor. Again, Kenya’s 
policy agenda includes economic rebalancing, 
strengthening private investment, improving 
tax and spending policies, and addressing rapid 
demographic shifts. Kenya should also undertake 
coordinated and collective action to deepen 
regional trade integration.
Kenya’s medium term plan must address the issues 
of economic growth, equity and macroeconomic 
stability and sustainability. As the economy 
has not generated enough modern jobs for the 
burgeoning youth, and as poverty levels are still 
at high levels,  significant proportion of Kenyans 
with limited employability are being squeezed 
into vulnerable, insecure, low-
paying jobs, mostly in the informal 
sector or subsistence agriculture. 
The situation is even worse among 
women, youth, as well as other 
groups that have one or more 
characteristics that become the 
ground for discrimination. Shrinking 
the informal sector requires both 
positive and normative actions, 
by improving their productivity, 
and implementing better labor 
standards. Both policies and 
goals on addressing inequality must be part 
of the MTP II agenda for the next 5 years. The 
agenda should focus not only on growth, but it 
should recognize the importance of growth for 
employment creation, and improved well-being. 
As such, a broader objective including inclusive 
growth and goals and targets on employment may 
be appropriate (see also UNDP/ILO Report May 
2012). 
Kenya’s policy 
agenda includes 
economic rebalancing, 
strengthening private 
investment, improving 
tax and spending 
policies, and addressing 
rapid demographic 
shifts 
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3.I   Poverty in Kenya 
At a time of major social and economic transitions, the conditions for attaining 
better living standards are increasingly within 
reach for a majority of Kenyans. In the past 
twenty years, Kenya’s economy has gone from 
shrinking to growing at nearly 5 percent per year; 
jobs, once predominantly in farming, are now 
predominantly in non-farm self-employment and 
wage work; families are smaller and more likely to 
settle in towns and cities; and people have more 
education and skills than ever before. Behind 
each of these transitions are each Kenyan’s quest 
for opportunity, and a desire for a better life for 
themselves and their children. 
Despite these major social shifts, we know little 
about how poverty has changed. Efforts to measure 
poverty and welfare in Kenya have been sporadic 
and inconsistent. In the 30 years spanning 1980 to 
2010, Kenya conducted four surveys that provided 
a basis to measure poverty—an average of one 
survey every 8 years.  In Latin America, surveys 
that enable poverty monitoring are conducted 
once every 3 years, and in East Asia once every 4 
years (Figure 3.1). Countries that devote resources 
to tracking social outcomes are in a better position 
to learn about the impact of their policy choices 
and make incremental improvements to policies 
over time. 
The latest reliable poverty estimates are 
almost a decade old. The 2005 Kenya Integrated 
Household Budget Survey (KIHBS) was the last 
nationally representative survey conducted by 
the Government of Kenya to measure poverty. 
Figure 3.1: Kenya needs to ramp up poverty monitoring
Poverty surveys by region between 1980-2010 (average)
Source: World Bank
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With strong economic growth, a peaceful political transition, a new constitution and a rapidly growing and educated labor force, Kenya has growing potential to tackle poverty. In 2005, 
close to 17 million Kenyans (47 percent of the population) were estimated to be living in poverty. 
As there has not been another nationally representative household budget survey since 2005 that 
enables poverty measurement, it is not known exactly how poverty has changed in the past 8 years. 
However, rapid economic growth is driving poverty reduction across the region and projections 
using national accounts data suggests that Kenya’s poverty rate is in the range of 34 and 42 percent. 
Broader measures of welfare point to a Kenya that is increasingly healthy, more educated and 
more connected, but a large proportion of Kenyans still live without access to clean water, good 
sanitation facilities and electricity. What can the government do to accelerate poverty reduction? By 
sustaining growth through sound fiscal and monetary policy; encouraging manufactured exports and 
improving the business environment so that more productive jobs for low and middle skilled workers 
are created; supporting smallholder farmers by connecting them to productive assets and markets; 
strengthening and expanding targeted cash transfer programs, and ensuring basic services are more 
accessible and responsive to everyone regardless of their location, wealth, ethnicity or gender. Lastly, 
a routine system of poverty monitoring with household budget surveys as a foundation is needed to 
understand where, how and why poverty is changing, and to inform Kenya’s policy efforts in the fight 
against poverty.
3. Poverty
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Without more frequent surveys, there has been 
a missed opportunity to understand whether the 
economic gains that have been achieved in the 
past decade, have generated opportunities widely 
for Kenyans and pathways out of poverty for the 
poor. 
Poverty and well-being are often understood 
in terms of income.  Today’s most widely used 
measure of poverty is the number of people living 
on less than 1.25 dollars a day—the extreme poor. 
The Millennium Development Goals adopted this 
measure for its target of reducing by half the rate 
of poverty between 1990 and 2015, and the World 
Bank recently endorsed the goal of reducing the 
percentage of extreme poor to 3 percent by 2030. 
Kenya’s own measure of poverty is based on the 
cost of purchasing a basket of food items which 
provides just enough calories (2,250 kilocalories) 
to meet daily requirements and an allowance for 
basic non-food amenities (Box 3.1).
Survey data from 2005 indicates that the scale 
of consumption poverty in Kenya is staggering, 
and is concentrated in rural areas. Based on 
Kenya’s national poverty line, close to half of the 
population (close to 17 million Kenyans) was poor 
in 2005 and the vast majority of the poor lived in 
rural areas.  Poor households are also more likely 
to depend on income and consumption from crops 
and livestock, as a source of livelihood (Table 3.1). 
Poor people are more likely to have low education 
levels and be part of larger families. Primary and 
secondary school completion rates are the lowest 
amongst the poorest individuals. In 2009, the 
average size of households among the poorest 
20 percent of households was 5.2 compared, to 
a national average of 4.3, and an average of 3.5 
among the wealthiest households.  
Day to day hardship accompanies the condition 
of poverty. Among the poorest Kenyans, 99 out 
of 100 live without electricity and without a flush 
toilet, 80 out of 100 share a living space with two 
or more people, and 64 out of 100 do not have 
access to an improved source of water.  
Table 3.1 : Looking back - patterns of poverty in 2005 
Kenya Overall Nairobi Other Urban Rural 
Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI
Fraction of the population 100 -- 7.5 -- 19.6 -- 68.3 --
Population in 2005 35.6 -- 2.7 -- 7.0 -- 24.3 --
Fraction of the population below the 
national poverty line (%)1
46.7 44.6–48.6 22 14.4 - 29.6 42.5 37.9 - 47.1 49.7 47.6 - 51.9
Number of poor below the national 
poverty line (thousands) 
 16,630  589  2,961  12,094 
Fraction of population below $1.25 
per day poverty line (%)2 
43.3 41.1 - 45.5 5.8 2.8 - 8.7 14.3 11.3 - 17.2 51.4 49.2 - 53.6
Number of poor below  $1.25 per 
day poverty line (thousands)
 15,419  155  996  12,508 
Poverty headcount by occupational 
sector of household head:
54.7 52.4 - 56.9 7  -5.8 - 19.7 53.4 41.9 - 64.9 54.9 52.6 - 57.2
Industry 42 37.3 - 46.7 24.6 14 - 35.2 50.8 43.5 - 58 46  40 - 52.1
Services 32.4 29.5 - 35.4 21.6 13.1 - 30.1 39.1 33.7 - 44.4 32.4 28.8 - 36
Share of employment by sector 
(%)3: 
57.1 54.7 - 59.6 3.3 1 - 5.6 7.5 5.8 - 9.3 69.1 67.1 - 71.1
Industry 8.8 7.8 - 9.9 23.4 18.3 - 28.5 17.7 15 - 20.4 6.7 5.7 - 7.7
Services 34.1 32 - 36.1 73.3 68.1 - 78.6 74.8 71.7 - 77.9 24.2 22.5 - 25.9
Total 100 -- 100 -- 100 -- 100 --
Gini coefficient 0.516 -- 0.581 -- 0.410 -- 0.383 --
Source: World Bank analysis of 2005 Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey
Special Focus: Poverty
June 2013 | Edition No. 834
Poverty rates are highest in the arid and semi-
arid regions in the north and north east. Areas 
with very little annual rainfall, and thus, low 
agricultural potential have acute poverty (Figure 
3.2).  These regions have also been historically 
neglected, reflecting Kenya’s unbalanced 
geographical development. In 2005, poverty rates 
in arid regions (78 percent) were nearly double 
the poverty rates in medium and high potential 
agricultural areas (with poverty rates averaging 41 
percent). 
Due to patterns of population density, the largest 
numbers of poor are concentrated in areas where 
land is most fertile. Medium to high potential 
agricultural areas only make up 20 percent of all 
land, yet are home to 80 percent of the population. 
As a result, the largest numbers of poor are found 
around the shores of Lake Victoria in the west, the 
central highlands around Nairobi and east of Mt. 
Kenya and the coast near Mombasa (Figure 3.3). 
With rapid and concentrated population growth 
in these areas, the pressure over productive land 
resources will continue to grow. 
Inequality in Kenya is high, especially among 
households in urban areas. In 2005, the average 
per adult equivalent expenditures among the 
bottom ten percent of households was KES 466 
and KES 1,110 in rural and urban areas—more than 
ten times smaller than the average expenditures 
among the top ten percent of households (KES 
5,741 and KES 22,823 in rural and urban areas, 
respectively).
Low income or material deprivation alone does 
not constitute the full experience of poverty. 
Global consultations with the poor reveal the 
overwhelming anxiety, grief, hunger, stress and 
low self-confidence associated with poverty. These 
emotions are linked to lack of security, power, 
poor health, discrimination and unstable work. 
In recognizing that income is not the only thing 
people care about, broader measures of poverty 
that attempt to capture a more complete picture of 
well-being have emerged. 
Broad indices of well-being indicate improving 
living conditions for Kenyans. The Multi 
Dimensional Poverty Index (MPI) developed by the 
Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, 
combines ten deprivations (each with a specific 
weight) in the categories of health, education and 
living standards into one overall index. According to 
this measure, a household is poor if it experiences 
at least a third of all possible weighted deprivations. 
Using Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data, 
the percent of poor people according to the MPI 
declined from 60.1 to 51.2 percent between 2003 
and 2008 (Alkire & Roche, 2013). Another measure, 
the Human Development Index (HDI) developed 
by the United Nations Development Programme 
combines life expectancy, mean years of schooling 
and Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in a 
single index. In 2012 Kenya’s HDI was 0.519, ranking 
it 145 out of 187 countries with comparable data. 
Since 1990 (when Kenya’s HDI was at 0.463) the 
HDI has improved at a rate of 0.5 percent annually 
(UNDP, 2013).
  Box 3.1: Kenya’s poverty line
In 2005, the cost of basic food and non-food needs per month for one adult was established at KES 1,562 for rural 
areas and KES 2,913 for urban areas. Throughout this report, the poverty rate or headcount refers to people living 
in households with per adult equivalent expenditures below these amounts. Adjusting for increases in prices since 
2005 using the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the approximate value of the rural poverty line in 2012 was KES 2,900 per 
month for rural areas and KES 5,400 per month for urban areas. 
Kenya’s poverty lines expressed in 2005 international dollars – the unit of measure used by the global 1.25 “dollar per 
day” measure of poverty—were approximately 1.57 dollars per day per person for rural areas, and 2.9 dollars per day 
per person for urban areas.  Expressed in Kenyan shillings, the 1.25 poverty line in 2005 was approximately KES 1,246 
per day.  Using this benchmark, Kenya’s 1.25 dollar a day poverty rate in 2005 was 43.3 percent overall. 
Source: World Bank
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Figure 3.2: The North and north-eastern, arid and semi-arid regions are the poorest regions in Kenya
Poverty estimates at the sub-location level, 2009
Source: World Bank
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Figure 3.3: The poor are concentrated where land is most fertile
Number of poor per square kilometer by sub-location, 2009
Source: World Bank
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Kenyans primarily equate poverty with an 
inability to meet basic human needs and a lack 
of cash income. The 2003 Afrobarometer asked 
Kenyans what they think about poverty. “Lack of 
food” and “Lack of money” were the most common 
responses along with lack of shelter and clothing. 
Poverty was also frequently associated with not 
having productive assets such as land or livestock; 
not having key opportunities such as an education 
or a job; and being physically handicapped (Figure 
3.4).
Among a range of poverty-related experiences, 
Kenyans most frequently report having lived 
without earning cash income. In 2011, almost 
three in four adult Kenyans said they went without 
a cash income, “many times”, “several times” or 
“always” during the year. The next most common 
experiences of deprivation (reported by one in 
three adult Kenyans) were not having enough food 
to eat, going without medical care or treatment, 
and not having enough clean water for the home. 
The proportion of Kenyans describing their living 
conditions as very bad or fairly bad doubled 
from 36 to 72 percent between 2003 and 2011. 
While responses to an opinion-poll should not 
be interpreted as evidence that welfare in Kenya 
is worsening, it is worth noting that Kenyans 
increasingly think of and perceive their living 
conditions in more negative terms. Understanding 
what is driving these perceptions could yield 
important insights about what Kenyans value the 
most, when thinking of their own living standards. 
Many Kenyans expect the government to 
reduce the gap between the rich and the poor, 
and to ensure that people have access to basic 
necessities. Inequality in Kenya is fairly high, and 
about one in five Kenyans think that an essential 
part of democracy involves a government that 
works to reduce inequality in society, and provide 
support to help families meet basic food, shelter 
and clothing needs. 
Figure 3.4:  Kenyans associate poverty with lack of food and money 
Frequency of words in response to “What do you associate with poverty?”
Source: World Bank
Kenya can do more with the resources it has to 
reduce hardship and improve well-being.  Among 
countries with comparable GDP per capita, 
Kenya is an average performer with respect to 
available measures of well-being, and is far from 
the frontier of what is possible. For example, 
while Nepal and Rwanda have lower income per 
capita compared to Kenya, their newborns are 30 
percent more likely to survive to the age of five. 
In Ghana, another country with a similar income 
level, the percentage of people experiencing 
multiple deprivations is 30 percent lower than in 
Kenya (Figure 3.5). 
3.2 How has income-poverty changed? 
Poverty rates in sub-Saharan Africa are falling. Using all available data, the World Bank 
estimates that the percentage of people living 
on less than $1.25 per day in sub-Saharan Africa 
fell from 56.5 to 48.5 percent between 1990 and 
2010, at a rate of about 0.8 percent per year. The 
majority of this decline occurred during the 2000s, 
fueled by GDP growth which averaged 5 percent 
per year. Given population growth, poverty rates 
have not declined fast enough to reduce the 
number of poor in the region, which increased 
from 290 to 413 million between 1990 and 2010 
(Figure 3.4). 
Experience from the region suggests that poverty 
reduction can occur at a very fast pace. Among 
countries with available data, Uganda, Rwanda 
and South Africa reduced poverty at over 2 percent 
per year over a period of between 5 and 7 years in 
the 2000s (Figure 3.4). In Uganda, poverty rates 
fell from 39 percent to 25 percent between 2002 
and 2009. Rwanda, another one of Kenya’s close 
neighbors, also made major gains against poverty; 
the drivers of this success are explored in more 
detail in Box 3.2. 
In Kenya, how poverty has changed is not 
clear because of the lack of regular household 
budget surveys. It is not known with certainty 
how poverty has changed since 2005, and until a 
new household budget survey is conducted, the 
poverty level will not be known.
This section presents results from two methods to 
estimate the likely trajectory of income poverty in 
the past 20 years. It should be noted up front that 
these methods, used by the World Bank and other 
institutions in settings where survey estimates 
of poverty are not available, rely on strong 
assumptions and produce estimates that are used 
only to get a first order approximation of changes, 
not specific poverty levels. The first approach 
models the trajectory of consumption per capita, 
both forwards and backwards in time from 2005 
by applying observed growth rates in GDP per 
capita from national accounts data to household 
consumption from KIHBS data. The second 
approach uses information on characteristics of 
households to predict consumption and poverty 
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Figure 3.5: Kenya’s welfare indicators in an international perspective
Purchasing Power Parity GDP per capita vs. Under-five mortality and Multidimensional Poverty
Source: World Bank
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in surveys that do not measure consumption 
directly. Annex 1 describes the methodology for 
both of these approaches in more detail. 
Assuming growth rates in GDP per worker closely 
follow the growth of household consumption, it 
is likely that poverty has declined in Kenya since 
2005, but the degree of decline depends on 
whether inequality has risen or fallen. Between 
2005 and 2011, per-worker income (adjusted for 
inflation) increased at approximately 2.2 percent 
per year on average. In a setting where this growth 
translates to increased consumption of 2.2 percent 
per year for all income levels, inequality would 
not change and poverty would fall. However, if 
growth disproportionately benefitted the already 
wealthy or middle class, income inequality would 
increase and poverty would fall at a slower rate 
(and possibly even increase).
Among growing economies, inequality tends to 
fall as often as it rises. A study of the relationship 
between growth and inequality over time within 
countries, found that historically, economic growth 
is distribution-neutral on average (Ravallion, 
2004).
Among countries in sub-Saharan Africa with 
available data, inequality fell by 0.5 percent per 
year on average between 1990 and 2010. The 
fastest rise in inequality (measured by the Gini 
coefficient described in Box 3.3) in the region 
during this period was over five percent per year 
in the Seychelles, and the fastest decline was 4.2 
percent per year in Malawi (the Gini fell from 50 to 
38 between 1998 and 2004). 
Given that Kenya’s economic growth is driven by 
domestic consumption and services, rather than 
extractive industries; it is likely that the benefits 
from growth have been spread broadly across 
income groups. In contrast to countries where vast 
oil or mineral endowments have driven growth 
such as in Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea or Angola, 
Kenya’s economic growth in the past ten years has 
not relied on commodity exports. The historical 
experience with commodity driven growth is that 
it benefits the few at the expense of the many. 
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  Box 3.2. A small country with big declines in poverty
        The role agricultural production and off-farm income in poverty reduction in Rwanda
Between 2001 and 2011 Rwanda’s poverty head count fell from 59 to 45 percent, a major success for the country in 
the fight against poverty. During this time, Rwanda posted average annual GDP growth of over 8 percent, translating 
into real improvements for households which now enjoy real consumption levels that are thirty percent higher than 
they were in 2001. 
More crop per acre, more cash per crop
More than 70 percent of Rwandans depend on agriculture for income, and it is the single most important source of 
income for the poor. It is no surprise then that increased agricultural production was a major driver of consumption 
gains and poverty reduction. In the past decade, agricultural production doubled at the household level, as did the 
share of households selling surplus harvests on the market. Behind these developments were increased investments 
in agricultural inputs, land consolidation and infrastructure. Specific public programs such as the Crop Intensification 
Program (CIP) and the Land Husbandry, Water Harvesting and Hillside (LWH) irrigation supported production gains, as 
did dramatically increased fertilizer use made possible through Government subsidized fertilizer imports. 
Don’t put all of your eggs in one basket
Rwandan households have increasingly taken up non-farm activities such as wage jobs and small businesses in 
addition to farming. In 2001 less than 30 percent of households had a non-farming activity, by 2011, the share of 
households with livelihood activities off the farm shot up to 70 percent. Interestingly, families did not abandon 
farming; they added income activities both as primary and secondary occupations. This has helped households to 
reduce the risk of bad weather that accompanies rain fed farming and provided a more regular source of cash income 
which boosted consumption.  
Source: Rwanda Economic Update 2013(World Bank, 2013)
Kenya’s pattern of growth gives more plausibility 
to scenarios of moderate, rather than extreme 
changes in inequality. However, given entrenched 
inequality between population groups defined by 
ethnicity and geography, the slow overall rate of 
increase in agricultural productivity and the urban 
nature of much of Kenya’s growth (Nairobi and 
Mombasa alone account for about 40 percent of 
the country’s wage earnings) it is difficult to say 
whether inequality has increased or fallen. 
In scenarios of moderately changing inequality 
(from a decline in the Gini coefficient of 1 percent 
per year, to an increase of 1 percent per year), 
national accounts based projections suggest 
that poverty declined from 47 percent in 2005 
to somewhere in the range of 34 and 42 percent 
in 2011. In rural areas, this scenario predicts 
that poverty fell from 50 to between 38 and 46 
percent, and in urban areas from 34 to between 
22 and 28 percent (Figure 3.7). (Annex 2 illustrates 
the impact of inequality on the distribution of 
consumption).
While growth is a necessary condition for 
poverty reduction, growth alone may not lower 
poverty. Even though Kenya sustained growth in 
real income per capita between 2005 and 2011, a 
2 percent per year increase in income inequality 
over this period would have erased the poverty 
reduction that would have otherwise accompanied 
that growth (Figure 3.8).
These simulations show that reducing inequality 
accelerates the poverty-reducing effect of 
economic growth. For each percentage point 
that inequality falls, the poverty rate falls by 
an additional 1.7 percentage points for Kenya’s 
observed trajectory of income growth. 
Data on the characteristics of households such as 
the quality of housing, the education of parents 
and the size of the family provides an indirect way 
to measure income poverty. As many nationally 
representative surveys collect in depth data on 
household characteristics, this information can 
Special Focus: Poverty
June 2013 | Edition No. 840
Figure 3.6: A decade of poverty reduction in 
Sub-Saharan Africa
US$1.25 dollar a day poverty in the 2000s
Source: World Bank
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be used to estimate consumption, even if it is not 
measured directly in the survey. This is achieved 
by estimating a consumption model using a survey 
that does measure consumption, and applying 
the model to surveys or census data without 
consumption data (Table 3.2) 
A consumption model estimated  households in 
Nairobi, other urban and rural areas, and applied 
to seven surveys spanning 20 years suggests that 
overall poverty declined by just over 1 percent 
per year between 1989 and 2009, with the most 
rapid poverty reduction occurring in Nairobi. This 
modeling technique predicts that poverty rates fell 
from 53 percent in 1989, to just over 42 percent in 
2009. For Nairobi, predicted poverty fell from 30 
percent in 1989, to 13 percent in 2009, for other 
urban areas from 44 to 37 percent, and for rural 
areas from 56 to 47.6 percent.   Figure 3.8 displays 
the poverty estimate obtained from each available 
survey as well as the average rate of change 
implied by these estimates.
3.3 How have broader measures of welfare 
changed?
The availability of census data and other surveys provide an opportunity to assess how 
non-income measures of welfare have changed 
in Kenya. Since 1989,Censuses have been 
conducted every 10 years, and the Demographic 
and Health Surveys every 5 years.  Combined, they 
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Figure 3.7: The Gini-coefficient in Kenya and the region  
Source: World Bank
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Table 3.2: Data sources with information on household welfare
Data Source Survey Year Sampled Households Household members
Census 2009 868,160 3,793,282
DHS 2008 9,057 38,515
KIHBS 2005 13,212 66,725
DHS 2003 8,561 37,612
Census 1999 314,976 1,394,965
DHS 1998 8,380 37,705
DHS 1993 7,950 38,865
Census 1989 217,632 1,066,869
Source: KIHBS = Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey / DHS = Demographic and Health Survey / WMS = Welfare Monitoring Survey
  Box 3.3: Know your Gini!
        Kenya’s inequality and how it is measured
One measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient. The 
Gini gauges how far the distribution of income in a 
population is from a scenario where all income is shared 
equally. In a perfectly equal society each household has 
the same income so that both the “bottom” and “top” 
ten percent of the population both earn 10 percent of 
all income. In this imaginary society, the Gini is equal to 
0.  In a very unequal society, the “bottom” ten percent 
of households earn a much smaller share of all income 
relative to the “top” ten percent of households. The 
maximum possible Gini for a country is 100 which would 
be a case where one person owns very close to 100 
percent of all income. In 2005, Kenya’s Gini coefficient 
was 47—markedly higher than its neighbors to the north 
and south (Ethiopia and Tanzania) but near the average 
of 45 for the region as a whole (Figure 3.7). 
Source: Rwanda Economic Update 2013 (World Bank, 2013)
capture data on educational attainment, child and 
maternal health, housing conditions, ownership 
of consumer durables and access to electricity 
among others.   
Assessment of a range of indicators points to a 
Kenya that is, on average, increasingly healthy 
and more educated, enjoying better living 
conditions and an expanded set of consumption 
opportunities. At the same time, a large fraction of 
the population continues to live with sub-standard 
access to water, sanitation and energy, and for 
many, circumstances given by the sheer luck of 
one’s birth, such as ethnicity, the wealth of the 
family and area of residence play an outsize role 
in determining access to basic opportunities (Box 
3.5). 
The past decade has been a major success for 
children’s health in Kenya. While under-five 
mortality rose in the early 1990s to a high of 116 
deaths per 1000 live births in 1999, in the 2000s 
under-five mortality fell by over 4 percent per year 
to reach 76 by the end of the decade, this was 
one of the fastest rates of decline in the region. A 
study of the drivers of infant mortality credits the 
scale-up of insecticide treated bed nets as a major 
contributor to this decline (Demombynes, 2012). 
Stagnant nutritional outcomes for children, 
however, point to the need for renewed focus on 
improving food security and behaviors around 
child care and feeding. Between 2003 and 2008, 
the percentage of children who were stunted an 
underweight remained at 35 and 16 percent, 
respectively. 
Educational attainment in Kenya has steadily 
increased. Among new entrants to the labor market 
(defined as individuals between the ages of 25 and 
35) the percentage without any formal education 
fell from above 20 percent in 1989, to less than 
15 percent in 2009. Overall the average number 
of years of formal education among 25 to 35 year 
olds has increased from 6 to 8 years between 1989 
and 2009. The education gap between women and 
men fell from 2.5 years in 1989 (7.3 years for mean 
and 4.9 years for women) to 0.7 years in 2009 (8.5 
years for mean and 7.8 years for women).  
Inequality in educational attainment between 
heads of households has declined significantly. 
Between 1989 and 2009, the Gini coefficient for 
educational attainment of the household head 
measured in years, fell from 0.54 to 0.38 at a rate of 
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Figure 3.8: Did strong growth drive poverty rates down? 
Depends how you think inequality has changed
National accounts based projections of headcount poverty
 in Kenya, 1990- 2011
Source: World Bank
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2 percent per year. This trend suggests the success 
of government efforts to expand the coverage of 
basic education.  The percentage of household 
heads without any formal education declined by 
3.6 percent per year between 1989 and 2009, and 
at the high end, secondary and post-secondary 
education is increasingly common: the share of 
household heads with post-secondary education 
increased by 11 percent per year between 1989 
and 2009 (Figure 3.9). 
Early signs of an emerging urban-based middle 
class are suggested by the increasing rates of 
ownership of “middle tier” consumer durables 
and housing quality indicators. Between 1989 and 
2009, ownership of televisions grew by 9 percent 
per year (1 in 3 households owned a TV in 2009), 
and refrigerators by 4 percent per year. The share 
of households with high quality materials for the 
roof and floor increased by over 2 percent per 
year in Nairobi, and access to electricity by about 
3 percent per year in urban areas. 
A mobile revolution swept Kenya this past 
decade, and is creating a platform for delivering 
a host of services to the masses. Between 2005 
and 2009, mobile phone ownership increased 
by over 30 percent per year on average, both in 
urban and rural areas. In 2009, almost two thirds 
of all households owned a mobile phone and it 
has surely reached a wider share of the population 
since then, as prices continue to decline. According 
to Afrobarometer data from 2011, over 80 
percent of adults owned their own phones, with 
an additional 10 percent using a phone owned by 
someone else in the household. 
Mobile money has become a fixture of the lives 
of Kenyans, including the poor. Launched in 
2007, M-Pesa—the globally known mobile money 
platform has extended a basic form of financial 
access to the population, including a way to 
transfer money, make payments and store money 
safely. Recently, a mobile savings product called 
M-Kesho was launched which provides interest 
earning accounts on small deposits. 
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Figure 3.9: More evidence that poverty has declined
Consumption model predictions of poverty in Kenya, 1990- 2011
Source: World Bank analysis of Kenya microdata
Notes: 95 percent confidence intervals are shown as vertical lines.
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For the poor, mobile money represents a more 
efficient way to receive financial support and 
to save. 10 percent of individuals in the poorest 
wealth quintile are registered with M-Pesa and 
tend to receive more money in remittances than 
they spend. Six percent of individuals in the 
poorest quintile also report saving on M-Pesa, and 
while it does not offer interest, it provides a secure 
storage mechanism and a potential commitment 
device to encourage saving. Evidence also 
suggests that registration to M-Pesa increases the 
likelihood of savings by 32 percent (Demombynes 
& Thegeya, 2012). 
Owned by one in four households in 2009, 
bicycles remain the most common form of 
private transportation. In Nairobi, ownership 
of cars and trucks are more common than bikes, 
but ownership of a car or truck has not grown 
over time,   remaining at about 15 percent of 
households. Households in rural areas increasingly 
owned bicycles. Ownership of motorbikes has 
grown at over 7 percent per year in other urban 
and rural areas albeit from a low base (motorbike 
ownership was between 3 percent in other urban 
areas and 2 percent in rural areas in 2009).
Access to improved water is evident in the 
modest rate of decline of reliance on surface 
water and other unprotected sources of water 
towards wells. However the overall figures mask 
the dynamic of declining access to piped or public 
tap water in the second tier urban areas outside 
Nairobi, where household access to piped water 
fell by 2.3 percentage points per year between 
1989 and 2009, and there is even some evidence 
of increasing rates of reliance on unprotected 
water in urban areas outside of the capital (Figure 
A1 in Annex 3).
The fact that top tier water and sanitation 
indicators (such as access to piped water and a 
flush toilet) have declined in urban areas outside 
of Nairobi, suggests that smaller towns and cities 
have not been able to keep up with the rapid 
rate of urbanization. Between 1989 and 2009, the 
urban population outside Nairobi grew from 2.2 
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Figure 3.10: The evolution of household characteristics
Source: World Bank
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to 8.9 million people at a rate of 7.3 percent per 
year. By comparison, over this period, Nairobi’s 
population grew by an average of 4.5 percent per 
year from about 1.2 to 3.1 million, while the rural 
population grew by an average of 1.9 percent per 
year from 17.9 to 26.2 million. 
Key indicators of hardship have declined over 
time across Kenya, but the number of households 
facing day to day hardship remains very large 
(Figure 3.10). Between 1989 and 2009, the share 
of households without any type of infrastructure 
that enables access to water fell from 50 percent 
to 38 percent. These gains were distributed across 
most geographic regions, with the exception of 
two counties: Kitui and Wajir where water-related 
hardship increased from 32.4 to 48 percent in 
Kitui and from 10.6 to 14.3 percent in Wajir. 
Even though households in the more remotely 
populated north and northeast are poorer, they 
are more likely to have access to wells as a source 
of water, compared to less poor households in 
western Kenya because rainfall, natural rivers, 
streams and lakes are not as common a feature of 
the region’s ecology. 
The share of households without any waste 
infrastructure (except possibly a bucket) declined 
from 21 percent in 1989 to 13.8 percent in 
2009. These improvements were widespread 
geographically, with the fastest reduction in 
sanitation hardship occurring in Nyamira, Bomet 
and Makueni counties, where the share of 
households without any waste facility fell by over 
70 percent. Counties where sanitation hardship 
increased over this period were Homa Bay and 
Vihiga in the western part of Kenya and Lamu on 
the coast. 
While household access to electricity increased in 
Kenya between 1999 and 1989, the improvements 
were more concentrated in the counties around 
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  Box 3.4:  Mais Iguais (“More Equal” in Portuguese)
          How did one of the most unequal countries in the world become more equal?
Inequality has been a persistent feature of Latin America, but beginning in the 2000s, inequality unambiguously 
declined across the region from an average Gini coefficient of 0.53 in the late 1990s to 0.497 in 2010.  The reduction 
in inequality accounted for 50 percent of the observed decline in poverty during this period. 
Brazil is widely associated with inequality and it has topped the charts for having at times that highest rate of 
inequality in the world. But things started to change in the early 2000s: between 1998 and 2009, the Gini coefficient 
declined by 5.4 percentage points per year reaching 0.537 in 2009. The rate of income growth among the bottom 10 
percent of earners (7 percent per year) outpaced the income growth of the top 10 percent of earners (1 percent per 
year) by a factor of seven.
More equal wage earnings across skill levels
Researchers found that real increases in labor income per working adult and a moderate decline in its inequality 
accounted for about half of the decline in overall income inequality. The reduction in inequality in labor income 
was driven by a narrowing of the gap between the earnings of skilled versus low or unskilled workers. Policies that 
expanded access to basic education broadly increased the pool of basic skills in the labor market. With a higher 
supply of workers with basic skills and relatively fewer unskilled or low skill workers the premium on skills declined, 
making wage earnings more equal across the board. The decline in labor earnings inequality was also due to falling 
wage differences between similar workers in large versus small cities, urban versus rural areas and between primary 
versus other sectors.  
More progressive government transfers
The contribution of government transfers also played a big role in equalizing incomes.  Since 2001, government 
programs – especially cash transfer programs – worked to broaden coverage of participants. BolsaFamilia- Brazil’s 
conditional cash transfer program – increased coverage rapidly reaching 17 percent of households in 2007 from 7 
percent in 2001.  The equalizing effects of both targeted cash transfer programs and contributory social security had 
about as large an effect as more equal labor incomes in reducing overall income inequality. 
Source: Pez-calva, and Ortiz-Juarez, 2012
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Figure 3.11: The geographic distribution of hardship in Kenya
The percentage of households with sub-standard access to Water, Sanitation and Energy, by county, 1999 and 2009
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Nairobi. After Nairobi (where about one in four 
households do not have access to electricity), 
the greatest improvement in energy-access was 
in Kiambu, Mombasa, Kajiado and Nakuru. One 
in three counties, mostly in the north, north east 
and far west of the country, did not experience 
a meaningful change in electricity access The 
hardship associated with not having electricity in 
the home is still very widespread, over 75 percent 
of households in 40 out of 47 counties in 2009 did 
not have any access to electricity.   
3.4 Making public spending work for the poor
With the implementation of Kenya’s new constitution, the next decade provides 
a tremendous opportunity for Kenya to use its 
public resources to reduce poverty.  Kenya’s 
new constitution represents an opportunity for 
policy makers and the citizens who elect them 
into office, to restructure and pressure public 
agencies to deliver services more efficiently and 
effectively. This section focuses on the sectors 
where government action can have the largest 
impact on poverty reduction. 
The government can alleviate poverty by focusing 
public spending and reform efforts on sectors that 
increase the human capital of the poor, and that 
allow the poor to access information and markets. 
Making access to basic, but effective health and 
education services easy, affordable and without 
risks, builds human capital and enables people to 
seize more productive economic opportunities – 
whether it is through diversification of employment 
into other industries or migration to areas where 
opportunities are available. Similarly, investing 
in information networks and infrastructure that 
connects high density rural areas to Kenya’s urban 
economic hubs will enable larger numbers of the 
poor to access markets for their products and 
labor and thereby increases income opportunities.
Targeted interventions that improve productivity 
gains in agriculture will help to reduce poverty. 
The agriculture sector employs the largest share 
of poor households in Kenya, and therefore 
investments that can improve the productivity 
of smallholder farms, such as fertilizer, improved 
seed varieties, access to markets and introduction 
of higher value added activities, carry great 
potential to reduce poverty.  
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  Box 3.5: Give them a chance
         How opportunities for children depend on their circumstances
An important dimension of inequality relates to opportunities that are available to children, where “opportunities” 
are defined in terms of access to education, health and household infrastructure facilities like water and sanitation. 
The Human Opportunity Index (HOI) is a measure that quantifies the extent to which existing opportunities for 
children in the country are equitably distributed across children by “circumstances” into which children are born. 
These circumstances include gender, economic status, geographic location and household characteristics.  
There is a growing consensus that equality of opportunity is desirable in that it levels the playing field so that 
everybody has the potential to achieve the outcomes they choose.There are two reasons why equality of opportunity 
is relevant for policymakers. The first is that people view as unfair opportunities that are accessed by circumstances 
rather than effort. The second reason is that inequality can be economically inefficient.
In school but without safe water
Children in Kenya have high equality of opportunities in education, but low equality of opportunities in health and 
household services (including adequate water, flooring, sanitation and electricity). Kenya’s HOI for school attendance 
is amongst the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa, but HOI levels for household services- such as water and sanitation - 
which are amongst the lowest in the sub-Saharan Africa.
Geographic location of households, family wealth and ethnicity shape life chances
Wealth, ethnicity and location of residence are circumstances that drive inequality of opportunities for children. 
Household wealth and ethnicity are the most important circumstances influencing differential access to opportunities 
in education and health; the geographic location of the households and household wealth are the most important 
circumstances contributing to inequality of household services such as electricity and water.
Source: World Bank
Better governance and accountability in 
institutions that deliver public services is 
crucial to ensure that services reach the poor. 
As exemplified by high teacher absenteeism in 
Kenya’s schools (Figure 3.14), current governance 
and accountability structures are inadequate and 
undermine the effectiveness of public spending. 
Policies that maximize incentives and effort within 
public service delivery agencies will translate into 
benefits for poor households. However, public 
accountability also requires informed and engaged 
citizens who can hold leaders and bureaucracies 
responsible for failures, so transparency and 
openness are also crucial. 
The poorest Kenyans report having  most 
difficulties in obtaining key public services, 
especially documents and permits, household 
services such as electricity and help from the 
police when needed (Figure 3.11). Problems 
with placing a child in primary school are much 
less frequently reported, which likely reflects the 
benefits of the Government’s efforts to expand 
access through the free primary education 
program. Large numbers of Kenyans also report 
having to pay bribes to obtain public services 
(Figure 3.12).  Compared to Tanzania and Uganda, 
Kenya has the highest rate of bribe payments to 
obtain household services, documents or permits, 
and avoiding problems with the police.  Bribe 
payments to obtain medical treatment are also 
common. 
Education
As of 2011, Kenya’s public expenditure on 
education was 20 percent of total government 
expenditure, and 7.2 percent of GDP.  Education 
expenditure increased by 42 percent in real 
terms between 2004 and 2011 (Government of 
Kenya, 2013).  Comparatively, the average public 
expenditure on education in sub-Saharan Africa 
was much lower—at 3.8 percent of GDP.  Of the 
total, the largest share of public spending goes 
to teachers’ salaries: primary school teachers 
alone account for 57 percent of total government 
spending on education. 
While there has been considerable improvement 
in the level of resources in public schools, learning 
outcomes remain low, especially among the 
poorest students. Results from a recent effort to 
track service delivery indicators in Kenya revealed 
that Kenya is doing well relative to other countries 
in the region, in providing key education inputs: 
in 2012, on average, there were 31 students per 
classroom, 33 students per teacher and 3 students 
per textbook. However, less than one in three 
public school students in standard 4 could read 
a standard 3 level short story. Testing done by 
Uwezo found that students from poor households 
scored between 20 and 40 percent lower on basic 
literacy and numeracy exams, than students from 
non-poor households. While resources in schools 
have improved, the poorest Kenyans perceive that 
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Figure 3.13: Nilihonga  (“I paid a bribe” in Swahili) 
Percent of citizens reporting having to pay a bribe to obtain 
services, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda
Source: 2005 Afrobarometer
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Figure 3.12: Getting services can be difficult, especially
 for the poorest 
Percent of Kenyans reporting difficulty obtaining public 
services by wealth quintile
Source: 2008 Afrobarometer
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problems with public schools most commonly have 
to do with inadequate facilities, overcrowding, 
lack of textbooks and teacher absenteeism (Figure 
3.13). 
Improving education outcomes will require 
exploring ways to make better use of educational 
inputs. One major source of inefficiency is teacher 
absenteeism. A service delivery indicator study 
conducted by the World Bank in 2012 found that 
an average of 45 percent of teachers were not 
teaching during an unannounced visit to schools. 
The majority of these absences were cases in 
which the teachers were not in class, even though 
they were present in school (Figure 3.14) and 
head teachers were more likely to be absent than 
other teachers. These findings suggest very weak 
monitoring and accountability at the school level.
Information campaigns to increase active 
participation by parents in their children’s 
education are one possible vehicle to improve 
governance and accountability within schools. 
Greater involvement by parents might assist in 
lowering teacher absenteeism rates, allowing 
better monitoring of teacher quality, and 
increasing the likelihood that disbursed funds are 
spent efficiently.  
An opportunity exists to leverage information 
technology for improved governance within 
schools, and for greater access to information at a 
lower cost.  The Ministry of Education has already 
made effective use of the telecommunications 
infrastructure, by disseminating national exam 
test scores through mobile phone networks. 
Given the high levels of mobile phone access by 
Kenyan households and the relatively low cost of 
electronic information dissemination, deploying 
information technology innovations within the 
education sector for both student learning and 
monitoring outputs and outcomes, should be 
explored.
With the increasing demand for secondary 
school education as a result of free day 
secondary education, it is increasingly important 
to address barriers to secondary attendance 
for poor households.  Currently, students from 
poor households are less likely than those from 
wealthier households to complete secondary or 
tertiary education, so policies that remove barriers 
to secondary education for the poor will help to 
boost completion rates. Evidence suggests that 
scholarship programs targeted at poor households 
can decrease the attendance gap in secondary 
schooling (Demery and Gaddis, 2009).
Health
Death and disability caused by the risks associated 
with poverty contribute heavily to Kenya’s overall 
burden of disease. Findings from the recent 
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Figure 3.14: Poor facilities and overcrowding are the most 
common problems associated with schools
Percent of Kenyans reporting various problems with public 
schools, by wealth quintile
Source: 2008 Afrobarometer
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Figure 3.15: Teacher absenteeism: At school but not teaching
Percentage of teachers by attendance status during 
unannounced visit
Source: Kenya PETS++ 2012
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Global Burden of Disease study indicate that 20 
percent of Kenya’s burden of disease (measured 
in Disability Adjusted Life Years—the years of life 
lost due to early death and living with disability) 
can be attributed to the following risks: childhood 
underweight; household air pollution; suboptimal 
breastfeeding; iron, vitamin A and Zinc deficiency; 
sanitation and unimproved water. These risks 
in turn result from the day to day hardship that 
poverty brings such as food insecurity and the 
lack of nutrition in diets, insufficient access to 
information about the benefits of low cost healthy 
behaviors (such as exclusive breastfeeding and 
good continued feeding practices) and sub-
standard housing infrastructure. These findings 
suggest that many of the upstream causes of early 
death and disability in Kenya can be addressed in 
large measure by one core prevention: alleviating 
poverty. 
As of 2010, Kenya’s total expenditure on health 
was 5.4 percent of GDP, below the SSA average of 
6.5 percent.  Health expenditure as a share of GDP 
and as a share of total government spending (now 
at 7.8 percent) has been increasing over time. 
Approximately 56 percent of Kenya’s total public 
spending on health is provided by development 
partners (Kenya Public Expenditure Review, 
2010)—which more than doubled in the past 
decade. 
Wide variation in per capita government spending 
and health personnel between counties indicates 
wide disparities in the ability of public agencies 
at the local level to provide adequate health care. 
For example, Isiolo county spends KES 1,800 per 
person on health, while Mandera spends less than 
KES 200.  Uasin Gishu has upwards of 250 health 
personnel per 100,000 people while Kilifi has less 
than 40 (Government of Kenya, 2013). 
Problems with care at health facilities are more 
frequently reported among the poorest Kenyans. 
When asked about problems with health facilities, 
the poorest Kenyans most commonly reported 
about long waits, lack of medicines, lack of 
attention and high cost of services (Figure 3.15). 
These responses reflect the challenge of ensuring 
that people in rural areas have access to adequate 
facilities, and trained and motivated health 
workers. 
Expenditure targeted at upgrading facilities and 
drug distribution networks at the health centre 
and dispensary level is likely to have a great direct 
impact on health care amongst the poor.  Health 
centres and dispensaries are the major source of 
primary level care for poor groups in rural areas 
of Kenya.  Historically, a high proportion of the 
funds intended for districts have failed to reach 
them. As of 2007, only 67 percent of allocations to 
districts were received, and receipt of funds was 
often delayed (Public Expenditure Tracking Survey, 
2007).  Further, the majority of these funds were 
spent at the district level, leaving peripheral 
facilities with very limited operating funds. 
With the new constitution, the responsibility of 
primary health care, including the financing and 
management of health facilities will fall on county 
governments. 
The Government of Kenya has established the 
Health Sector Services Fund (HSSF) to disburse 
operational funds directly to health centres 
and dispensaries, in an effort to improve 
service delivery and accountability.  The HSSF 
was established in recognition of the fact that 
inadequate access to resources is a contributor 
Figure 3.16: Long waits and lack of medicines are the most 
common problems associated with health facilities
Percent of Kenyans reporting various problems with health 
facilities by wealth quintile
Source: 2011 Afrobarometer
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to poor facility performance.  HSSF resources 
are channeled directly to each designated 
facility’s bank account, and managed by a local 
health facility committee (HFC).  The phased 
implementation of the HSSF began in October 
2010.  While HFC members have the potential 
to improve accountability, many have not 
received any training in their roles or in facility 
management.  Additionally, there is confusion 
over HFC roles, with facility staff and HFC 
members expressing different opinions (Opwora 
et al., 2011). The potential of the HSSF to improve 
facility performance by directly channeling funds 
and involving communities in fund management 
and prioritization is promising. This promise, 
however, is conditional on how it is implemented 
and shaped in the context of devolution, where 
currently, the future management of the fund 
is uncertain, and more confusion between key 
stakeholders may arise. 
Demand-side voucher schemes to allow the 
poor in need of specialized medical care to 
claim medical benefits, and subsidization of 
transport costs from rural areas to national 
referral hospitals will help to reduce disparities 
in access to specialized healthcare.  Funding to 
pay for emergency referral transport is low, and 
disproportionately excludes poor individuals from 
receiving specialized treatment.  National referral 
hospitals are concentrated in urban areas, and 
the highest concentration of medical specialists 
is found in Nairobi.  Poor individuals in need of 
specialized treatment, thus need to travel to the 
closest referral hospital with adequate facilities. 
 
Incentive programs and policies to recruit and 
retain health workers in rural and remote areas 
can help to lower the gap in health care provision 
between urban and rural areas.  Health workers 
tend to prefer working in urban areas, resulting 
in an undersupply of workers in rural and remote 
areas.  There is evidence that a mix of strategies can 
help to attract trained health staff to these areas. 
For example, locating professional schools and 
residency programs outside of capitals or having 
certain clinical rotations in rural areas, can increase 
the likelihood that graduates choose to practice in 
rural areas. In addition, financial incentives (such 
as hardship allowances, grants for housing or paid 
vacations) can offset opportunity costs of working 
in rural areas. Improving the working conditions 
of rural health facilities (such as providing safe 
working environments, supportive supervision 
and mentoring) can also encourage staff to take 
opportunities outside of urban centers (WHO, 
2010). 
Infrastructure
Kenya’s utilities are largely inefficient; they are 
characterized by high production costs, volatile 
supply and losses in distribution.  Access to 
electricity and water is largely dependent on 
rainfall cycles.  Within the power sector, 57 percent 
of total power supply is generated through hydro 
power.  Kenya Power and Lighting Corporation 
(KPLC) reports transmission and distribution 
losses of 18 percent, compared to a best practice 
of 10 percent, and captures only 85 percent of 
potential revenues (Kenya Public Expenditure 
Review, 2010).  These losses are an indication 
of poor maintenance and rehabilitation of the 
network.  Within the water sector, water utilities 
are capturing less than 60 percent of the revenues 
they need to operate effectively, largely a result of 
underpricing and high non-payment rates (Kenya 
Public Expenditure Review, 2010). 
Policies to increase the water storage capacity 
of utilities will lower susceptibility to Kenya’s 
rainfall cycles.  Within the water sector, 
investment to exploit water harvesting during 
heavy rainfall cycles, for example through artificial 
dams, will result in lower vulnerability during 
periods of drought.  Within the electricity sector, 
diversification of power sources to geothermal 
and wind power will lower dependency on hydro 
power and lower the incidence of rationing during 
dry seasons.  The government has embarked on 
an ambitious plan to increase power supply within 
Kenya.
Government subsidies to lower or eliminate 
electricity connection costs for poor households 
may increase uptake of electricity connections 
amongst poor households.  Within slum areas, 
KPLC already charges a reduced connection fee 
of KES 1,000, which is highly subsidized over the 
regular connection fee of KES 35,000 (Kenya Public 
Expenditure Review, 2010). However, the fee 
remains restrictive for the poorest households.
Improved governance and accountability 
systems within utilities can set the foundation 
for improved service delivery. Poor governance 
remains an issue for service delivery within the 
water and electricity sectors. Historically, these 
sectors have been characterized by high rates of 
unaccounted losses, poor revenue collection rates, 
low levels of maintenance and mismanagement. 
Improving performance through increased 
oversight and accountability can help overcome 
these challenges.
3.5 What will it take to make poverty history?
The dream of a Kenya free of extreme poverty is attainable.  Experience from the region 
shows that achieving rapid reductions in extreme 
poverty is possible, the challenge for Kenya and 
other countries in the region is to sustain these 
gains and to make poverty reduction a national 
priority.  
Available evidence suggests that Kenya’s 
progress on poverty reduction between the early 
1990s and 2005 was negligible. Consequently, 
Kenya is unlikely to attain the first Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG1) of reducing by half 
the proportion of the population living below 1.25 
dollars per day (extreme poverty) between 1990 
and 2015. In 2005, 43.4 percent of Kenyans were 
classified as extreme poor by this international 
standard. There is however, no reliable estimate 
for extreme poverty in 1990—the baseline year 
of MDG1. Using the national accounts based 
simulation presented in Section 2, and assuming 
distribution-neutral growth, a ballpark estimate of 
extreme poverty in 1990 is 45.6 percent. 
To achieve the first Millennium Development 
Goal, poverty headcount would need to drop by 
20 percentage points between 2005 (43 percent) 
and 2015 (estimated target of 23 percent). 
Broadly speaking, poverty reduction can be 
achieved through two complimentary channels: 
growth and redistribution in favor of the poor 
(reduction in inequality). Figure 3.16 shows the 
combinations of growth (horizontal axis) and 
redistribution (vertical axis) that would allow 
the attainment of MDG1 . In a scenario without 
redistribution (and as a result no reduction in 
inequality) household consumption levels would 
need to grow by 49 percent in real terms between 
2005 and 2015 to attain MDG1. This corresponds 
to annual consumption growth of 4.1 percent 
(horizontal intercept in Figure 5.1). To put this into 
perspective, annual growth in per capita GDP in 
Kenya averaged 1.9 percent between 2005 and 
2011. Even in the case of a moderate reduction 
in inequality (an annual decline in inequality 
of 0.5 percent-the average for SSA), household 
consumption levels would need to grow at more 
than 3 percent per year to attain the MDG poverty 
target by 2015. In a case of no growth in household 
consumption whatsoever, the Gini coefficient 
would have to drop from 0.47 in 2005 to 0.33 in 
2015, an annual decline of 3.5 percent .    
Shaping the post-2015 agenda, the Development 
Committee of the World Bank Group recently 
endorsed the goal of eradicating extreme poverty 
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Figure 3.17: Reaching the first Millennium Development
 Goal is unlikely
Combinations of growth and inequality reduction necessary to 
attain MDG1between 2005 and 2015
Source: World Bank
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within a generation globally. This goal has been 
specified as reducing the proportion of people 
living on less than $1.25 per day to no more than 
3 percent by 2030. In Kenya, this entails reducing 
poverty by 40 percentage points between 
2005 and 2030. What will it take for Kenya to 
achieve this goal? Figure 3.17 shows the possible 
combinations of growth and redistribution 
necessary by to attain the target. In the absence of 
redistribution, household consumption will need 
to increase almost four-fold between 2005 and 
2030, requiring an annual consumption growth of 
5.6 percent. With an average decline in inequality 
of 0.5 percent per year, consumption will still 
need to grow by 3.2 percent per annum to attain 
the target, a daunting task given Kenya’s modest 
performance during the past decades. 
Despite the large reduction in poverty needed to 
eliminate extreme poverty, it is not beyond reach. 
For instance, a reduction in inequality of 1 percent 
per year coupled with an annual consumption 
growth rate of 2.1 percent would suffice to hit 
the target (Figure 3.17). With annual growth of 
2.5 percent, inequality will need to decline at 0.8 
percent per year to achieve the goal. If inequality 
could be reduced by 1.5 percent per year, a 
modest consumption growth rate of 1.2 percent 
per annum would be enough to hit the target.
These simulations highlight the important 
mediating role played by inequality dynamics in 
poverty reduction (see Box 3.6). It is clear that in 
the absence of redistribution, it will be hard for 
Kenya to attain growth rates that are sufficiently 
high, to make significant dents in poverty and 
reach the 2030 target. The scope for rapid poverty 
reduction will crucially depend on the extent to 
which the Government can bring down inequality 
levels by adopting policies that are more likely to 
result in pro-poor growth, ensuring good basic 
services are available everywhere and designing 
effective social protection mechanisms (Box 3.7). 
3.6  Poverty reduction: the way forward
The analyses presented in this report suggest the following areas as possible elements of a 
poverty-reduction agenda: 
  Box 3.6: Turbocharging Poverty Reduction: The Case of Rwanda
        How changes in inequality hamper or boost poverty reduction
The importance of inequality dynamics in boosting or complicating poverty reduction is nicely illustrated by 
Rwanda’s experience over the past decade. Between 2001 and 2006, household consumption in Rwanda grew at a 
solid pace of 2 percent per year, resulting in a real consumption gain of over 10 percent. However, poverty dropped 
by only two percentage points (59 percent in 2001 and 57 percent in 2006). 
The disappointing performance in terms of poverty reduction during this period is explained by rising inequality: 
If inequality had remained constant, poverty would have fallen by more than 5 percentage points instead of the 2 
points actually observed. In the subsequent five years (2006-2011), household consumption in Rwanda grew at 3 
percent per annum, and the incidence of poverty fell by 12 percentage points. Although strong, growth in household 
consumption accounted for “only” 8.5 percentage points of the reduction in poverty. The decrease in inequality 
added another 3.5 percentage points-more than the total poverty reduction in the preceding period.
Source: World Bank
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Figure 3.18: What Will it Take for Kenya to Reduce Extreme 
Poverty to 3 Percent by 2030?
Combination of growth and inequality reduction necessary 
to reduce extreme poverty to 3 percent by 2030
Source: World Bank
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Executive Summary
June 2013 | Edition No. 854
(1) Fostering pro-poor economic growth and job 
creation 
(2) Enhancing the productivity of smallholder 
farms
(3) Using public spending to make key 
opportunities available to Kenyans of all 
backgrounds
(4) Strengthening and expanding the cash 
transfer programs that protect and provide 
income support to the poor
(5) Investing in a system of routine household 
budget surveys to monitor poverty and 
inequality
Poverty reduction needs sustained economic 
growth, but the nature of that growth also 
matters.  If Kenya’s growth and job creation is only 
concentrated at the high-skills end—for example 
in industries that hire software engineers or 
bankers, the poverty reducing effects of growth 
will be limited. However, if more productive jobs 
become increasingly available to people with 
low and medium skills—these jobs will represent 
pathways out of poverty. To encourage the 
growth of low and middle skills jobs, especially 
in manufacturing, the government can work to 
incentivize exports and improve the investment 
and business environment more broadly.  
Pro-poor growth cannot be achieved without 
modernizing smallholder farming. Since the 
majority of Kenya’s poor depend on smallholder 
agriculture for their livelihood, increasing their 
  Box 3.7: Strengthening Social Protection in Kenya
        Why cash transfers not food aid should become the backbone of social assistance for the poor in Kenya
Kenya’s commitment to social protection is encoded in the constitution and in the National Social Protection Policy 
(NSPP) of 2012. Social protection programs in Kenya fall under three categories: social security, social health insurance 
and social assistance (or safety nets). As a majority of the people who benefit from social security (pensions) and 
health insurance are formal sector workers, social assistance programs are most relevant for the poor and vulnerable. 
Emergency food aid dominates social assistance
The most common type of social assistance programs are food programs—emergency food aid in response to droughts 
or floods and school feeding programs. These programs jointly absorb over 80 percent of all safety net beneficiaries, 
and make up over half of all safety net spending. Five social cash transfer programs targeting orphans, the disabled, 
older persons and the food insecure make up 13 percent of all safety net beneficiaries. Support through emergency 
food aid, while important, is sporadic, unpredictable and ineffective in reducing chronic poverty. Cash transfers on 
the other hand provide regular and predictable income support, and have played a key role in reducing poverty and 
improving health and education outcomes among the poor in many countries around the world (See Box 3.4).  
Scale up, harmonize and strengthen cash transfers
While the number of people covered by cash transfer programs has increased since 2005, they only reach about 
8 percent of the poor population. Kenya’s cash transfer programs are small, fragmented and unable to respond 
when shocks hit. Improving the effectiveness of these programs will require ramping up government spending on 
them, improving coordination among implementing agencies, and building capacity for programs to respond to 
shocks, using early warning systems and contingency funds that can mobilize additional resources when needed. The 
government is seeking to implement these recommendations through the establishment of the National Safety Net 
Program.
Source: World Bank
Figure 3.18: Pillars of Social Protection in Kenya 
Source: World Bank
Pillars of Social Protection in Kenya
I. Social Security 
National Social Security Fund 
Civil Service Pension Fund  
II. Social Health Insurance 
National Hospital Insurance Fund
III. Social Assistance (Safety Nets) 
Food Aid Programs 
General food distribution 
Supplementary feeding 
Regular school meals
Home grown school meals
Cash Transfer Programs 
Orphans & Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) 
Hunger Safety Net Program (HSNP) 
Urban Food Subsity Program (UFSP)
Persons with severe disability cash transfer
Older Persons Cash Transfer (OPCT) 
Food/ Cash for Assets 
June 2013 | Edition No. 8 53
productivity through the use of fertilizer, improved 
seeds and access to markets for agricultural 
production, will drive poverty reduction in the 
short to medium term.
Poverty reduction can be complemented with 
greater equity in Kenyan society and achieved 
in part through stronger cash transfer programs, 
and more equitable and effective public 
spending. Cash transfer programs worldwide 
have been shown to help reduce poverty and 
vulnerability, through predictable income support 
that studies show that households use to improve 
their consumption, to invest in productive assets 
and meet their health and education goals. Kenya 
has a host of cash transfer programs that reach 
a very small share of the population in need, are 
fragmented and not able to respond to shocks. 
Strengthening and expanding these programs with 
their increased prioritization in the government 
budget, should be a central pillar of Kenya’s 
poverty reduction strategy (Box 3.7). 
Leveling the playing field in access to key 
opportunities—such as quality education, energy, 
water and sanitation—has the potential not only 
to boost growth, but also to reduce inequality. 
Circumstances such as family wealth, ethnicity 
or the geographic location of the household 
play an oversized role in influencing access to 
opportunities that can enhance the health, 
education and overall well-being of children in 
Kenya. These circumstances should not matter 
and public spending should work to remove 
their influence, so that every child has the same 
chance to seize the opportunities being generated 
in a growing Kenya. This will require focusing 
financial and human resources in areas that have 
been historically neglected (such as remote rural 
and arid areas) and building transparency and 
accountability to ensure that these resources are 
used effectively. 
A substantial part of inequality in Kenya can be 
explained by inequality in labor income, which is 
in turn determined by inequality in access to and 
quality of education. Ensuring that children from 
all walks of life have access to quality education 
will expand the pool of skilled workers, which 
would have positive effects on poverty reduction, 
both through a growth effect (skilled workers 
earn more) and an inequality effect (having a 
higher supply of skills would drive down the skills 
premium and reduce inequality).  
Kenya’s inconsistent record of monitoring poverty 
and the importance of understanding the nature 
of changes in growth and inequality, calls for a 
systematic program of rigorous household data 
collection. As suggested by the simulations, the 
effects future growth will have on poverty will 
largely depend on whether inequality increases 
or decreases, and the pace of its change. Simply 
measuring economic growth through national 
accounts, will not convey useful or reliable 
information on the evolution of poverty. To 
convincingly monitor the impact of Government 
policies on household consumption growth, 
equity and poverty reduction, comprehensive 
and comparable household surveys need to 
be implemented regularly. This will not only 
determine whether progress is being made, but 
will also identify areas where policies need to be 
adapted or stepped up, to maximize their impact 
on poverty reduction.     
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Annex 1: Macroeconomic environment
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP Growth Rates (percent) 1.5 2.7 5.8 4.4 4.6
    Agriculture -4.3 -2.5 6.3 1.5 3.8
    Industry 4.7 2.8 5.4 2.9 4.5
    Services 2.7 6.7 3.8 5.2 4.6
Fiscal Framework (percent of GDP)
    Total Revenue 21.8 21.9 23.8 23.8 22.8
    Total Expenditure 27.2 27.9 29.7 29.2 28.9
    Grants -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.5
    Budget Deficit (incl grants) -4.3 -5.2 -5.1 -4.3 -5.6
    Total Debt 45.6 47.5 49.9 48.5 45.2
External Account (percent of GDP)*
     Exports (fob) 18.7 14.4 16.5 17.1 15.1
     Imports (cif) 42.5 32.8 39.1 43.5 40.3
    Balance of Trade -15.7 -12.4 -14.7 -18.9 -17.0
    Current Account Balance -7.3 -5.3 -7.9 -9.8 -11.2
     Financial and Capital Account 5.6 7.8 8.4 9.7 14.2
    Overall Balance -1.7 2.5 0.5 -0.1 3.0
Inflation (average) 16.2 10.5 4.1 14.0 9.6
Exchange Rate (Average KES/$) 69.2 77.4 79.2 88.8 84.5
Source: KNBS, IMF and CBK
* As at 31 December 2012
Annex 2: GDP Growth Rates 2008-2012 Kenya SSA EAC
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008-2012
Kenya 1.5 2.6 5.6 4.5 4.6 3.8
SSA (excluding South Africa) 6.1 4.0 6.1 5.3 5.8 5.5
Uganda 8.7 7.2 5.9 6.7 3.4 6.4
Tanzania 7.4 6.0 7.0 6.3 6.5 6.7
Rwanda 11.2 4.1 7.2 8.6 7.7 7.8
Source: World Bank Global Economic Prospects 2013
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Annex 3: Kenya annual GDP
Years
GDP, current prices
GDP, constant 
prices
GDP/capita, 
current prices
GDP Growth
Kshs (Billions) Kshs (Billions) U.S. dollars Percent change
2000 968 965 399 0.6
2001 1026 1011 413 4.7
2002 1039 1014 408 0.3
2003 1142 1042 456 2.8
2004 1274 1090 478 4.6
2006 1623 1229 637 6.3
2007 1834 1315 749 7.0
2008 2108 1357 813 1.5
2009 2367 1394 793 2.7
2010 2554 1475 810 5.8
2011 3049 1540 833 4.4
2012 3440 1610 991 4.6
Source: KNBS
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Annex 5: Inflation
Year Month Overall Inflation Food Inflation Energy Inflation Core Inflation
2011 January 5.4 8.6 5.7 1.4
February 6.5 9.8 7.8 1.8
March 9.2 15.1 9.6 2.5
April 12.1 19.1 12.7 3.6
May 13.0 20.1 14.4 4.0
June 14.5 22.5 15.5 4.8
July 15.5 24.0 16.2 5.6
August 16.7 23.9 16.8 8.5
September 17.3 24.4 17.6 9.1
October 18.9 26.2 19.2 10.4
November 19.7 26.2 20.6 11.8
December 18.9 25.0 19.7 11.6
2012 January 18.3 24.6 17.3 12.1
February 16.7 22.1 14.8 12.1
March 15.6 20.3 13.0 12.0
April 13.1 16.2 11.1 11.0
May 12.2 14.6 10.0 11.3
June 10.1 10.5 9.0 10.7
July 7.7 6.6 7.4 9.7
August 6.1 3.6 6.7 9.0
September 5.3 2.9 6.0 8.3
October 4.1 1.4 5.0 7.0
November 3.3 1.7 3.1 5.5
December 3.2 1.7 2.8 5.5
2013 January 3.7 2.4 3.9 5.2
February 4.5 4.0 4.6 4.9
March 4.1 2.9 5.3 4.8
April 4.1 3.6 4.3 4.6
May 4.1 4.3 3.5 4.1
Source: World Bank Calculations based on KNBS data
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Annex 6: Tea production and exports
Year Month Production Price Exports Exports value
MT Ksh/Kg MT Ksh Million 
2011 January 35,999 256 31,110 7,871
February 26,711 251 28,814 7,223
March 22,459 243 35,852 8,890
April 31,482 241 32,084 7,900
May 32,856 245 31,898 7,825
June 28,955 264 34,957 7,825
July 26,343 283 33,629 8,907
August 24,471 294 32,693 9,266
September 30,493 292 26,430 9,333
October 39,926 291 29,422 7,686
November 36,825 269 33,353 8,855
December 41,393 251 35,187 9,334
2012 January 36,205 250 35,382 9,145
February 18,412 245 37,656 9,123
March 17,859 251 31,280 9,415
April 18,118 256 26,816 7,804
May 37,383 264 25,060 6,445
June 30,197 279 29,148 7,770
July 24,306 288 28,054 7,813
August 31,920 288 30,996 8,798
September 33,549 280 30,689 8,771
October 40,235 272 33,167 9,448
November 39,977 277 38,681 10,840
December 41,401 281 30,067 8,463
2013 January 45,390 284 40,190 11,383
February 38,503 271 34,585 10,071
March 33,368 241 32,534 8,619
April 45,390 284
Source: KNBS
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Annex 7: Coffee production and exports
Year Month Production Price Exports Exports value
MT Ksh/Kg MT Ksh Million 
2011 January 3,774 682 3,067 1,282
February 3,851 640 3,261 1,671
March 3,639 587 4,204 2,155
April 2,298 474 4,254 2,294
May 0 0 3,878 1,963
June 1,136 596 2,677 1,322
July 3,305 592 2,857 1,749
August 4,558 582 3,096 1,955
September 2,904 593 3,317 2,161
October 1,388 543 3,298 2,134
November 1,331 541 1,990 1,173
December 1,800 603 1,672 940
2012 January 4,770 544 3,094 1,454
February 6,505 369 3,668 1,937
March 3,317 389 5,069 2,550
April 4,801 342 4,625 2,369
May 5,472 303 4,924 2,275
June 3,884 258 4,887 2,098
July 3,086 298 5,727 2,397
August 3,948 277 4,484 1,712
September 4,474 265 4,421 1,596
October 2,924 263 4,482 1,690
November 1,794 272 4,110 1,453
December 1,075 308 2,223 740
2013 January 3,938 344 2,790 1,062
February 4,825 320 3,955 1,429
March 4,074 327 3,179 1,188
April 6,038 279
Source: KNBS
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Annex 8: Horticulture exports
Year Month Exports Exports value
MT Ksh. Million
2011 January 16,231 7,470
February 17,531 7,368
March 21,287 7,548
April 23,448 7,159
May 21,839 8,315
June 17,730 6,836
July 15,420 5,531
August 16,128 6,582
September 15,658 6,745
October 17,553 9,508
November 17,277 6,647
December 16,145 8,915
2012 January 14,974 8,721
February 16,053 6,726
March 18,967 6,515
April 17,408 6,317
May 17,027 6,013
June 15,271 6,227
July 17,349 7,813
August 15,869 5,825
September 16,506 7,567
October 19,708 11,368
November 18,347 7,742
December 18,250 9,036
2013 January 18,398 9,071
February 21,576 9,198
March 19,814 7,061
April 19,790 5,228
Source: KNBS
June 2013 | Edition No. 8 65
Annexes
Annex 9: Local electricity generation by source (Million KWh)
Year Month Hydro Geo-thermal Thermal Total
2011 January 296 119 188 603
February 246 105 200 551
March 259 126 225 610
April 237 120 224 582
May 264 124 222 610
June 268 118 200 586
July 263 122 226 611
August 254 125 234 614
September 249 121 224 595
October 253 122 225 601
November 263 115 208 587
December 331 125 156 613
2012 January 330 129 169 627
February 332 125 159 616
March 293 134 194 620
April 273 124 175 572
May 323 132 159 615
June 342 129 147 618
July 358 119 168 646
August 348 122 176 645
September 358 119 168 646
October 360 129 166 654
November 372 121 159 652
December 369 130 148 647
2013 January 377 129 169 675
February 333 113 160 606
March 348 135 160 645
April 345 152 140 637
Source: KNBS
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Annex 10: Soft drinks and sugar production 
Year Month Soft Drinks Sugar
Galvanized 
Sheets
Cement
"000" litres MT MT MT
2011 January 34,446 55,974 22,094 364,432
February 32,457 52,069 22,386 335,247
March 36,156 53,842 22,928 355,858
April 31,162 52,061 20,957 363,035
May 26,622 49,130 24,744 376,246
June 28,910 38,818 24,677 365,494
July 28,478 25,884 24,906 393,149
August 28,580 26,060 24,659 405,546
September 29,674 22,815 17,988 407,838
October 28,540 28,990 16,619 361,941
November 27,366 32,689 22,104 364,789
December 38,962 36,729 24,033 384,853
2012 January 34,317 53,852 22,940 350,615
February 32,009 49,480 19,655 378,453
March 37,363 52,342 21,507 397,009
April 29,331 44,914 20,892 360,540
May 24,359 40,503 22,197 381,026
June 27,391 45,111 17,180 396,951
July 22,073 41,607 21,411 398,458
August 24,458 37,058 23,040 399,873
September 31,113 32,503 23,268 382,141
October 32,540 30,123 20,473 421,579
November 31,497 31,886 21,969 415,866
December 33,067 34,651 21,283 357,212
2013 January 34,246 49,046 .. 387,527
February .. 50,036 .. 377,561
March .. 43,647 .. 373,337
April .. .. .. 375,237
Source: KNBS
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Annex 11: Tourism arrivals
Year Month JKIA MIA TOTAL
2011 January 79142 35770 114912
February 69221 31211 100432
March 71734 26027 97761
April 66276 10181 76457
May 74148 5167 79315
June 72944 6676 79620
July 131519 12037 143556
August 113438 23402 136840
September 85397 17317 102714
October 88918 18741 107659
November 89394 19641 109035
December 94355 21624 115979
2012 January 83450 28134 111584
February 80405 24636 105041
March 75668 19965 95633
April 72023 7531 79554
May 71287 4830 76117
June 90972 5934 96906
July 108136 12671 120807
August 108869 17771 126640
September 90153 13312 103465
October 95911 12942 108853
November 83122 16135 99257
December 92365 23290 115655
2013 January 85838 26446 111984
February 48970 24031 73001
March 52103 17850 69953
Source: KNBS
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Annex 12: New vehicle registration
Year Month All body types
2011 January 18805
February 16190
March 16497
April 12560
May 15115
June 21546
July 19128
August 18797
September 16802
October 17202
November 17640
December 15559
2012 January 13730
February 12693
March 13066
April 8257
May 16652
June 15091
July 22577
August 16970
September 12003
October 15449
November 14867
December 11689
2013 January 20997
February 16928
March 17061
Source: KNBS
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Annex 13: Exchange rate
Year Month USD UK POUND EURO
2011 January 81.0 127.7 108.2
February 81.5 131.5 111.3
March 84.2 136.1 117.9
April 83.9 137.1 121.1
May 85.4 139.5 122.4
June 89.0 144.4 128.1
July 89.9 145.0 128.5
August 92.8 151.9 133.0
September 96.4 152.1 132.7
October 101.3 159.4 138.7
November 93.7 148.2 127.1
December 86.7 135.1 114.1
2012 January 86.3 133.9 111.4
February 83.2 131.4 110.1
March 82.9 131.2 109.6
April 83.2 133.2 109.6
May 84.4 134.3 108.0
June 84.8 132.0 106.5
July 84.1 131.2 103.5
August 84.1 132.1 104.2
September 84.6 136.3 108.8
October 85.1 136.8 110.3
November 85.6 136.8 109.9
December 86.0 138.8 112.8
2013 January 86.9 138.8 115.5
February 87.4 135.5 116.9
March 85.8 129.4 111.3
May 84.1 128.8 109.2
Source: CBK
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Annex 16: Money aggregate
Year Growth Rates (yoy)
Broad money 
supply ( M2 ) Money ( M1 ) Money ( M0 ) Reserve Money
2011 January 21.5 24.3 18.0 16.1
February 20.5 28.0 17.5 19.7
March 19.4 29.7 18.5 18.0
April 18.2 24.3 19.0 20.1
May 16.6 23.3 17.3 7.9
June 14.5 21.2 17.4 4.8
July 14.7 19.6 19.2 11.5
August 15.2 20.4 19.7 14.8
September 14.3 16.9 18.2 12.5
October 14.0 19.6 16.2 8.1
November 13.8 12.4 16.3 9.5
December 14.1 7.9 11.4 14.5
2012 January 10.6 5.3 13.0 17.2
February 11.2 5.7 12.5 10.4
March 11.5 1.4 13.1 23.2
April 13.0 6.1 8.1 14.7
May 12.5 1.7 10.6 13.2
June 13.1 0.6 6.6 16.7
July 13.9 2.3 3.6 15.6
August 15.0 4.1 5.7 8.4
September 14.3 6.3 5.4 9.7
October 15.8 5.6 3.8 6.7
November 18.1 9.3 7.7 14.0
December 17.2 14.1 7.8 15.1
2013 January 18.2 16.0 11.4 12.2
February 17.0 15.5 17.5 23.9
March 15.7 17.8 15.9 11.5
April 18.5 20.0 13.5 9.5
Source: CBK
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Annex 17: Mobile payments
Year Month Number of agents
Number of 
customers
Number of 
transactions
Value of 
transactions
(Millions) (Millions) (Billions)
2011 January 33968 16.7 28.2 75.4
February 34572 16.9 28.5 76.3
March 36198 17.5 32.7 89.0
April 37309 17.8 32.4 86.1
May 38485 17.9 35.3 94.4
June 42840 18.1 35.8 92.6
July 43577 18.3 38.0 99.7
August 44762 18.6 39.3 107.4
September 46234 18.9 39.2 108.6
October 47874 19.2 40.6 109.1
November 49091 19.5 41.2 112.3
December 50471 19.2 41.7 118.1
2012 January 52315 18.8 40.2 114.1
February 53685 18.8 41.8 116.7
March 55726 19.2 45.8 126.1
April 56717 19.5 44.4 117.4
May 59057 19.7 48.0 128.4
June 61313 19.8 47.9 124.0
July 63165 19.6 49.4 129.3
August 64439 19.4 49.7 131.4
September 67301 19.7 48.9 130.7
October 67301 19.7 48.9 130.7
November 70972 20.0 51.9 137.7
December 75226 20.3 53.6 139.0
2013 January 76912 21.1 56.0 150.2
February 85548 21.4 53.4 142.7
March 88393 21.8 53.5 141.1
April 93211 22.3 52.4 134.4
Source: CBK
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Annex 18: Nairobi stock exchange (20 share index) and the dow jones (New York)
Year Month
2011 January 4464.9 11,892
February 4240.2 12,226
March 3887.1 12,320
April 4029.2 12,811
May 4078.1 12,570
June 3968.1 12,414
July 3738.5 12,143
August 3465.0 11,614
September 3284.1 10,913
October 3507.3 11,955
November 3155.5 12,046
December 3205.0 12,218
2012 January 3224.9 12,633
February 3303.8 12,952
March 3366.9 13,212
April 3546.7 13,214
May 3650.9 12,393
June 3703.9 12,880
July 3832.4 13,009
August 3865.8 13,091
September 3972.0 13,437
October 4147.3 13,096
November 4083.5 13,026
December 4133.0 13,104
2013 January 4416.6 13,861
February 4518.6 14,054
March 4,861 14,579
April 4,765 14,840
May 5,007 15,116
Source: NSE, and NYSE
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Annex 19: Nominal and real exchange rate
Year Month
NEER
2003=100
REER 
2003=100
2011 January 114 74
February 115 73
March 119 76
April 120 74
May 122 75
June 127 77
July 128 77
August 133 79
September 135 80
October 141 82
November 130 75
December 119 68
2012 January 119 67
February 116 66
March 115 65
April 115 65
May 115 65
June 115 65
July 114 65
August 114 66
September 116 67
October 117 67
November 117 67
December 117.6 66.7
2013 January 118.6 66.4
February 119.0 66.6
March 115.7 64.4
April 113.6 62.8
Source: CBK
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Annex 22: Growth Outlook
2012 2013* 2014* 2015*
BASELINE
GDP 4.6 5.7 5.9 5.5
Private Consumption 2.7 2.9 3.1 2.8
Government Consumption 8.0 4.6 3.7 3.0
Gross Fixed Investment 20.5 12.1 15.0 13.2
Exports, GNFS 5.0 5.4 6.4 6.7
Imports, GNFS 13.0 5.8 8.0 7.7
Output Gap (Percent of Potential GDP) -0.2 0.6 1.3 1.8
HIGH CASE SCENARIO
GDP 4.6 6.1 6.7 6.5
Private Consumption 2.7 3.1 3.1 3.1
Government Consumption 8.0 4.6 3.7 3.0
Gross Fixed Investment 20.5 15.0 19.0 18.0
Exports, GNFS 5.0 5.4 6.4 6.7
Imports, GNFS 13.0 7.0 9.0 9.5
Output Gap (Percent of Potential GDP) -0.2 0.8 2.1 3.1
LOW CASE SCENARIO
GDP 4.6 4.4 4.4 4.6
Private Consumption 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.7
Government Consumption 8.0 4.6 3.7 3.0
Gross Fixed Investment 20.5
Exports, GNFS 5.0 5.4 6.4 6.7
Imports, GNFS 13.0 5.0 6.0 6.5
Output Gap (Percent of Potential GDP) -0.2 -0.5 -0.7 -0.5
Source: World Bank Computation
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Maize is very important in daily Kenyan meal 
with a per capita consumption level of 77.2 kg 
per year1  and at the same time taking a large 
proportion of lower income groups’expenditure. 
Increased maize prices would be therefore 
transmitted to food inflation; affect food security 
and therefore leading to escalated poverty levels 
and widened income inequalities. Kenya’s prices 
for maize have been trending above global maize 
prices, triggered by several factors including the 
hike of global food prices, and more importantly 
bad climatic conditions that affected domestic 
production which accounts for74 per cent 
of maize domestic supply.2 However a major 
challenge would be how high these prices are.
Existing data sources showed irregularities in 
maize price levels, despite the fact that they all 
had the same trends. KNBS, FAO and M-Farm 
maize prices data are compared in Figure 1 below. 
KNBS prices are monthly retail prices collectedin 
different markets across the country. FAO and 
M-Farm’s; which are both non-governmental 
bodies; are at a wholesale basis from major 
towns of the country including Nakuru, Busia, 
Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Eldoret and Kitale. 
Contrarily to other sources, M-Farm daily data 
offers an advantage of getting a better estimate 
of monthly average; and also reduces the 
probability of having data gaps. For comparison, 
prices from all sources were normalized to 
US dollar per metric ton and weighted with 
counties population shares to reach an overall 
average. A three months moving average was 
used to overcome the problem of missing 
values. All data sources displayed high price in 
July which shrank in September before picking 
up again in January. This trend is attributed to 
maize planting and harvesting seasons.
To some extent these inconsistencies arise as 
a result of different methodologies used in 
data collection and distribution costs across 
markets. FAO and M-Farm maize pricesboth 
being at a wholesale level are close at an average 
deviation of US$ 17 per MT for the period 
since January 2011. However, data gaps are 
wide between M-Farm and KNBS. The average 
deviation of M-Farm from KNBS price levels was 
US$ 80 per MT in Kisumu, US$ 87 in Mombasa, 
US$ 103 in Nairobi and US$ 118 in Eldoret for the 
same period. Retail prices of KNBS may reflect 
distribution cost, profits, and the gap became 
much higher in 2012 compared to the year 2011. 
1 FAO Statistics (values  for the year 2009) from www.fao.org
2  According to FAO  in 2009: total production was 2.4 million MT while supply was 3.2 million MT.
There are wide maize price disparities across data sources, and all lie above global maize prices.
Source: World Bank staff computation based on KNBS, M-Farm, FAO and GEM data.
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3 Ariga, J et al, 2010. Staple Food Policies in Kenya, a Paper Prepared for the COMESA policy seminar on Variation in Staple Food Prices: Causes, 
Consequence, and Policy Options. The Comesa-MSU-IFPRI African Agricultural Marketing Project (AAMP). Maputo, Mozambique, 25-26 January 
2010.
For the three sources of data, maize is relatively 
cheaper in Eldoret and Kisumu which are among 
the largest maize surplus markets compared to 
Mombasa and Nairobi.
Whereas quality data plays a vital role in offering 
accurate information which may further be 
used for analysis and forecasting; where data 
is wrong or does not exist at all, it would be 
hard for policy makers not only to provide and 
predict good development paths but also to 
evaluate their existing policies’ implications. 
Domestic maize prices also increased over time 
due to Kenya National Cereal and Produce Board 
(NCPB) inefficiency in its intervention in maize 
market to fix prices for both sale and purchases. 
Government initiative through NCPB to promote 
free and fair trade in commodities and their 
timely accessibility putpressure on maize prices 
both at wholesale and retail levels. Not only 
have NCPB purchase prices been above those in 
other domestic markets but also its sellers have 
been mainly large-scale farmers.3
 … with data inconsistencies at a lower level in Kisumu
Source: Computation based on KNBS, M-Farm and FAO data
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National Accounts based predictions of poverty
The general approach models the trajectory of 
consumption per capita obtained from household 
surveys using observed growth rates in GDP per 
capita from national accounts (Datt, Ramadas, 
Mensbrugghe, Walker, & Wodon, 2002). The 
model can accommodate different GDP and 
population growth rates for specific regions and 
economic sectors and different scenarios of how 
the distribution of consumption (inequality) 
changes over time.  In this application, per adult 
equivalent household consumption is projected 
both forwards and backwards from the 2005 
KIHBS to produce yearly poverty estimates (using 
the 2005 absolute poverty line) between 1991 
and 2011 (Demombynes & Hoogeveen, 2007). 
The model relies on data from three sources: 
household consumption from KIHBS, GDP data 
from national accounts and employment data 
from the census (Table below).
The base projection calculates per adult 
equivalent consumption recursively:
Forward projection 
from 2005 to 2011:
Backward projection 
from 2005 to 1991:
   
The survey weights are adjusted similarly to 
reflect year by year population changes:
Forward projection 
from 2005 to 2011:
Backward projection 
from 2005 to 1991:
 
The assumption of distribution-neutral growth 
can be relaxed by adjusting consumption for 
each household within each sector year-by-year:
Annex 24: Methods
Consumption model parameters
Model Parameters Detail Data Source and Notes
Per adult equivalent consumption for 
samplehousehold  in year .
2005/06 KIHBS.
Individual weight for  household in 
year .
2005/06 KIHBS.
Sector of household  in survey year 
(2005)
2005/06 KIHBS, based on primary occupation 
of household head.
Real GDP growth rate for sector  of 
household in year . 
WDI/Kenya National Accounts.
Employment growth rate for sector  of 
household  in year .
World Development Indicators:  
To obtain sector-specific population growth 
rates, the overall employment: population ratio 
was used in combination with the share of total 
employment by sector of occupation obtained 
from the Census and 2005/06 KIHBS. 
The average growth rate between known data 
points was used. 
Gini coefficient growth rate in sector  in 
year .
Annexes
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This adjustment is applied after the base 
projection is completed. If inequality has 
increased, this procedure redistributes 
consumption from households with 
consumption levels below the average for their 
sector of employment to households above the 
average for their sector of employment. Note 
that in a scenario where growth is distribution 
neutral, the change in the Gini coefficient is 
zero and no adjustment is made to 
consumption. The core assumption of this 
model is the correspondence between growth 
in consumption per capita measured in the 
household survey and growth in income per 
capita measured through national accounts. 
Household asset based predictions of poverty 
Only a brief exposition of the procedure is 
outlined here as comprehensive and detailed 
explanations are provided elsewhere 
(Christiaensen, Lanjouw, Luoto, & Stifel, 2011; 
Elbers, Lanjouw, & Lanjouw, 2002). The poverty 
head count estimate (or any other welfare 
measure based on consumption) is defined as a 
function of consumption 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡  (for household ℎ, 
in cluster 𝑐𝑐 at time 𝑡𝑡) (in this case 𝑡𝑡 = 2005) 
as𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡ሺ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡ሻ. To obtain a definition of 
consumption that can be applied to predict 
consumption at any future  𝑡𝑡 ൅ 𝑛𝑛 or past 
 𝑡𝑡 − 𝑛𝑛  point in time, an estimator of log-linear 
consumption at time t is defined as follows:  
𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡 ൌ 𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡
′ 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 ൅ 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡     
   
where  𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡′  are the 𝑝𝑝 consumption predictors 
that are available at the household level both at 
time 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑡𝑡 ൅ 𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 − 𝑛𝑛,  𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡  is a vector of 𝑝𝑝  
parameters and 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡  is a heteroskedastic error 
term that is made up of a cluster component 
ሺ𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 ሻ and a household component ሺ𝜖𝜖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡ሻ as 
follows  𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡 ൌ 𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 ൅𝜖𝜖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡 . To obtain the 
variance-covariance matrix of (1) a GLS 
regression model is used (as the error term is 
not independent and identically distributed). 
The procedure estimates both the variation of 
𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  (which captures the correlation between 
consumption in groups of households that are 
spatially proximate) and the variance of𝜖𝜖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡 .  
Since at time 𝑡𝑡 ൅ 𝑛𝑛 only 𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐ℎ ǡ𝑡𝑡൅𝑛𝑛′  is observed and 
not consumption 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ ǡ𝑡𝑡൅𝑛𝑛 , the error term 
𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐ℎ ǡ𝑡𝑡൅𝑛𝑛 is also unknown and the expected value 
of poverty 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡൅𝑛𝑛  is estimated given the 
observed 𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐ℎ ǡ𝑡𝑡൅𝑛𝑛′  and the estimated model 
parameters of (1) so that 𝐸𝐸ሾ𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡൅𝑛𝑛ሺ𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐ℎ ǡ𝑡𝑡൅𝑛𝑛′ , 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡൅𝑛𝑛 , 
𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐ℎ ǡ𝑡𝑡൅𝑛𝑛ሻሿ . This expectation is computed through 
simulation by taking draws from the estimated 
distributions of 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡and 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡 Ǥ Note the core 
assumption is that 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡൅𝑛𝑛  = 𝛽𝛽 𝑡𝑡  (the distributions 
of 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡  remain constant over time) and the 
relationship determining the hetorskedastic 
nature of the data generating process is also 
assumed to be constant.  
The adapted SAE technique relies on the strong 
assumption that the parameter estimates that 
define consumption are stable over time. 
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Annex 25: Illustrations of distributional impact of inequality 
on the distribution of consumption
The effect of growth and 3 different scenarios of inequality on 
the distribution of consumption, 2005 – 2011, Rural Kenya
Source: World Bank
Monthly expenditure per A.E. (2005 KES)
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The effect of growth and 3 different scenarios of inequality on 
the distribution of consumption, 2005 – 2011, Urban Kenya
Source: World Bank
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Annex 26. National accounts based predictions of poverty 
using $1.25 dollar per day poverty line
National accounts based projections of headcount poverty 
in Kenya, 1990- 2011
Source: World Bank
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Kenya entered 2013 on a strong economic footing, and after peaceful elections and 
transition, growth is projected to rise to 5.7 percent at the end of the year, and 6 percent 
in 2014, supported by lower interest rates and higher investment growth.
This report focuses on poverty reduction in the new Kenya, citing the progress made 
since 2005, when an estimated 47 percent of the population lived below the poverty line, 
to the present, where poverty estimates range between 34 and 42 percent, the 
imprecision resulting from the lack of any recent survey data. The report notes the 
spatial dimension of poverty, and the poor tend in the arid and semi-arid regions in the 
north and north east. It concludes with thoughts about a poverty reduction strategy, 
which would emphasize on job creation, enhanced productivity of smallholder farms, 
strengthening and expanding cash transfer programs, targeted public spending 
programs to provide quality education to the rural poor, and improved poverty 
monitoring, so that the government can rapidly see which activities have the greatest 
impacts on improving the lives of the poor. 
Join the conversation!
Text message your answers to:
+254 700 186 473
Tweet your answers using the 
following hashtag in your response:
#tumalizeumaskini
WHAT CAN GOVERNMENT DO TO
REDUCE POVERTY IN KENYA?
Time to shift gears
Accelerating growth and poverty reduction in the new Kenya
